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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON SELF-EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL
CAPITAL, AND FIRM FORMATION
by
Fatma Deli
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor

This dissertation explores how economic, organizational, and personal factors affect
self-employment transitions, occupational decisions, and firm formation activities of
individuals at different positions in the skill distribution. The first essay of my
dissertation studies how local unemployment rates differentially affect entry into selfemployment by individuals at different places in the skill distribution. The empirical
results show a positive correlation between local unemployment rates and entry into selfemployment for low-ability workers, but not for high-ability workers. Including employer
size to eliminate possible distortions showed that the positive association between
unemployment and self-employment among low-ability workers is in fact driven by the
small firm effect. Controlling for firm size yields a negative association between
unemployment and self-employment among high-ability workers.
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Effects of organizational capital, human capital and physical capital, on the firm
formation activities of people at distinct skill levels depend on the type of the industry
which is chosen for the new firm. Two types of industries, capital-intensive and abilityintensive, are utilized to explore this hypothesis in the second essay. A capital-intensive
industry requires more physical investment, and consequently more funds, whereas, an
ability-intensive industry requires more human capital. It is shown that high human
capital requirements are associated with higher earnings among the most able individuals,
and therefore makes them more likely to found firms in an ability-intensive industry.
Wealthy people are more likely to establish both capital-intensive and ability-intensive
firms, even though the amount of funds necessary for two industry types differs.
Moreover, entry into both industries is predicted to happen later in life due to the removal
of entry barriers constituted by required investment spending using savings when old.
Empirical mixed results are observed.
The third essay investigates earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and
their non-entrepreneurial colleagues. Results show that high-ability firm-owners in an
ability-intensive industry were earning more than those that remained in wage-work,
whereas, low-ability firm-owners in a capital-intensive industry were earning less than
those remaining in paid-work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the creation of new firms is an important driver of new product and job
creation, entrepreneurship plays a crucial role in economic growth. The important role
of self-employment has stimulated the interest of researchers in understanding its
determinants. Much of the literature is focused on the importance of personal
characteristics in the prediction of self-employment. However, there are still unanswered
questions about the roles of existing economic conditions and their interactions with
personal characteristics in transitions into self-employment. The three essays in this
dissertation focus on how economic, organizational, and personal factors affect selfemployment transitions, occupational decisions, and firm formation activities of
individuals at different positions in the skill distribution.
Data taken from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) are used for empirical
analysis in my research. The PSID is a longitudinal study of U.S individuals and family
units. Because of PSID's longitudinal nature, I can observe personal economic activities
in each year and therefore I can detect any changes in personal data. The longitudinal
nature of the data set allows me to identify the timing of transitions from paid-work to
self-employment for each person. Additionally, the PSID has data regarding personal
characteristics including age, gender, education, work experience, occupation, wealth,
prior employment, region, and annual labor income that are also crucial for my research.
As indicated in the literature, individuals at the lower and upper ends of the skill
distribution are more likely to be self-employed [Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger,
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(2008)]. That is, these low and high ability people are the ones who found new firms.
Therefore, workers are classified in my samples according to their ability levels, which is
assessed in the following way: I use econometrically unexplained income as a proxy for
ability, and to measure this, I use personal data to control for characteristics affecting
labor income in the wage regressions.

The first essay of my dissertation studies how local unemployment rates
differentially affect entry into self-employment by individuals at different places in the
skill distribution. The study uses two samples, for the periods 1978-1983 and 1993-1995,
from the PSID and exploits state and temporal variations in unemployment rates.
Consistent with the literature on push-entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepreneurship,
I expected to find a positive correlation between local unemployment rates and the
probability of becoming self-employed for people at the low end, and a negative effect at
the high end of the skill distribution. The results show a positive correlation between
local unemployment rates and entry into self-employment for low-ability workers, but not
for high-ability workers. Given relationships that have recently been reported between
ability, firm size and employment choice, it is possible that results are distorted by the
omission of controls for firm size. Controls for employer size are available for one of the
two samples. Including them indicates that the positive association between
unemployment and self-employment among low-ability workers is in fact driven by the
effect of employer size. Controlling for firm size yields a negative association between
unemployment and self-employment among high-ability workers.
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My second essay explores the role of organizational capital in firm formation
activities of individuals at different skill levels over time. Transitions into
entrepreneurship are also influenced by the type of industry which will be chosen for the
new firm. Whether the industry requires more capital or more ability is an important
criteria for a potential entrepreneur to consider while founding a new firm. A capitalintensive industry refers to an industry requiring substantial investment in capital assets,
and consequently requiring more liquidity for entry. An ability-intensive industry,
however, is an industry requiring more human capital instead of physical capital for
production. My research investigates how organizational capital, human capital and
physical capital, constitute barriers to firm formation by individuals at different skill
levels over time.
Since people have different skill levels and different amounts of initial wealth,
required organizational capital for the new firm may constitute an effective entry barrier.
Not having enough money constitutes an entry barrier for a capital intensive-industry,
while not having enough skill

constitutes an entry barrier for an ability-intensive

industry. My study includes a model simulating interactions among a representative
utility maximizing agent and his/her profit maximizing firm. I also analyze testable
implications of my model empirically by using a sample, for the period 2003-2007, from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
My model illustrates the followings: Both industry types, capital-intensive and
ability-intensive, require funds for investment spending in the model. However, the
3

amount necessary for a capital-based firm is greater than amount necessary for an abilitybased firm. Moreover, high human capital is also necessary for an ability-based firm.
Thus, a required high skill level induces the most able individuals to found firms in an
ability-intensive industry. Firm formation by individuals in distinct places of the skill
distribution depend on their initial wealth and saving behavior. That is, if they have high
initial wealth, and if the monetary return from a capital-intensive industry is greater than
the return from an ability-intensive industry and paid-work, then they prefer to found a
firm in a capital-intensive industry when young. Another option of self-employment for
young individuals who do not have high initial wealth is to form a firm in an abilityintensive industry if their skill levels allow. If the monetary return from an abilityintensive industry is greater than the return from a capital-intensive industry and paidwork, then they found a new venture in an ability-intensive industry in the first period of
their life even though their initial wealth is limited. Otherwise, they stay at their current
jobs and save to accumulate the required funds for investment in a capital-intensive or an
ability-intensive industry. These latter individuals establish their own firm in the second
period of their life by using their savings.
Mixed empirical results about the predictions of the model are observed. That is,
more personal ability makes high-ability individuals more likely to establish ability-based
firms. In contrast, low-ability individuals are more likely to work as wage-earners than to
found their own firms when personal ability level increases. It is empirically shown that
higher wealth makes people more likely to found both capital-based and ability-based
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firms. The regression estimates indicate that entry into an ability-intensive industry often
happen later in life for lower-skilled people. Entries into a capital-intensive industry also
happens later in life for low-ability individuals but not for high-ability ones.
My third essay empirically analyzes earning differentials between future
entrepreneurs and their non-entrepreneurial colleagues by considering the industries
chosen by entrepreneurs. Two types of industries, ability-intensive and capital-intensive,
are defined for the analysis. A sample from the PSID covering the period 2003-2007 is
utilized to test my hypotheses. The empirical results are consistent with my hypotheses.
That is, individuals who form firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more
than others remaining in wage-work. Since an ability-intensive industry requires a
relatively high skill level, they are more likely to have higher ability. On the other hand,
people who found firms in a capital-intensive industry were earning less than other
employees remaining on the job. They are more likely to be lower-ability workers
because capital-intensive industry requires more liquidity and less ability.

This dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the first essay
Opportunity and Necessity Entrepreneurship: Local Unemployment and the Small Firm
Effect, section 3 contains the second essay Organizational Capital and Barriers to Firm
Formation, and the last section shows the third essay Who earns more? Future
Entrepreneurs or Their Non-Entrepreneurial Colleagues.
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II. CHAPTER 1 : OPPORTUNITY AND NECESSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
LOCAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE SMALL FIRM EFFECT
Introduction
Since entry into self-employment has an important place in the creation of many new
firms, products, and services, it affects nearly all markets of the economy. The crucial
role of entrepreneurship leads researchers to focus on the determinants of selfemployment. Creation of new organizations by entrepreneurs depends on several
parameters including personal characteristics, or existing conditions.

Much of the research has focused on the roles of individual characteristics like age,
education, and gender in the probability of entry into self-employment. These individual
characteristics affect not only the likelihood of becoming self-employed, but also affect
personal income which, in turn, is also related to the likelihood of becoming selfemployed. The literature shows that incomes of wage-earners and self-employed
individuals are not the same [Hamilton (2000)]. Hamilton (2000) finds that the median of
three distinct measures of self-employment earnings reported in the 1984 Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) were lower than wages, while their variance
was greater. 1

1 Gort and Lee (2007), found that average earnings of self-employed respondents in the NSF Scientist
and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT), were higher than those of wage-earners. However, the
SESTAT sample is biased towards high earners, where self-employed incomes are higher. On the other
hand, they find that incomes of wage-earners are higher than those of self-employed individuals at the
lower end of the distribution.
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The standard explanation for this result is that self-employment earnings and wages
respond differently to variations in ability. Constructed models of employment choice
show that return to ability is convex among the self-employed and linear among wage
earners [Braguinsky and Ohyama (2008); Astebro, Chen and Thompson (2009)]. This
induces individuals in the tails of the ability distribution to choose self-employment over
wage work. Their models are consistent at the upper end of the earning distribution with
the economics of superstars (Rosen, 1981), and at the lower end with Min’s (1984) claim
that lower end of the earnings distribution is populated by “misfits” who cannot work
well with others.

Variations in returns to ability can explain the static distributions of self-employment
earnings and wages, but they do not offer a clear explanation of how people enter into
self-employment. Instead, transitions have been explained in the contexts of opportunity
and necessity entrepreneurship. Block and Wagner (2006) define opportunity
entrepreneurs as individuals who start a business in order to pursue an opportunity, and
necessity entrepreneurs as individuals who are driven into self-employment because of
limited opportunity in the wage sector. Because the former are attracted into selfemployment by the identification of opportunities, they are more likely to establish new
firms when economic conditions are good. In contrast, necessity entrepreneurs are often
driven into self-employment after becoming involuntarily unemployed, so they are likely
to be more common in periods of rising and high unemployment.
The present section links these two disparate lines of inquiry – variations in ability
7

and the distinction between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs – by analyzing the
effect of variations in the local unemployment rate on the propensity to enter selfemployment for individuals of differing ability. Opportunity entrepreneurs tend to have
high levels of creativity and personal ability and, as a result tend to be located in the
upper end of the earnings distribution, both before and after entering self-employment. As
a result, I expect that high-ability individuals are more likely to enter self-employment
when local unemployment rates are low. Necessity entrepreneurs, on the other hand, see
no better alternative for earning money than becoming self-employed. These people are
not generally creative and are often low-ability employees. Consequently, we expect that
high local unemployment rates stimulate entry into self-employment among individuals
with low ability.

These hypotheses are tested using observations on a large sample of individuals in the
PSID, matched in each year to the unemployment rate prevailing in the state of residence.
Two panels are constructed, for the periods 1978-1983 and 1993-1995; the latter, shorter,
panel is included because I will need to control for employer size in a number of
regressions that follow.

Since the likelihood of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship is related to
personal ability, I construct an indicator for innate ability from the residuals obtained in a
regression of earnings on age, gender, education, work experience, industry, occupation,
and state of residence (cf. Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1999). Individuals are placed in five
8

ability groups, denoted by A1 through A5, with A1 representing the lowest ability group.
These are not quintiles. Groups A1, A2, and A3 each account for 25 percent of the
observations, A4 accounts for the next fifteen percent, and A5 represents the highest ten
percent.
The main analysis consists of logistic regressions examining how the probability of
transitioning from wage employment into self-employment is affected by the local
unemployment rate, estimated ability, and interactions between ability and local
unemployment. My hypothesis is that the coefficient(s) on the interaction between ability
and unemployment will be positive among the low ability group(s), and negative for the
high ability group(s). The key results are as follows. For the 1978-1983 sample, the
probability of becoming self-employed is on average increasing in the local
unemployment rate. However, when effects are allowed to vary by ability group, local
unemployment stimulates entry into self-employment for groups A1 through A4, but not
for the most able individuals, in group A5. These results are robust to the inclusion of
controls for age, gender, education, and work experience. Qualitatively similar, but
statistically insignificant results, are obtained for the 1993-1995 sample; the lack of
statistical significance may be the result of the modest sample size resulting from only
having two years of transitions. Because of the reduced sample size, I reduce demands on
the data by merging groups A1 through A4 on the basis of personal skill level. While the
point estimates continue to indicate that local unemployment stimulates entry into selfemployment for the low-ability group but not for high-ability group, these results remain
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statistically insignificant.
The results that have been obtained may be the result of failure to controls for firm
size. Employees of small firms are far more likely to become self-employed than are
employees of larger firms (Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger, 2008). Employment in
small firms is more volatile and susceptible to negative economic shocks (Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992; Davis et al., 1996; Rob, 1995), and that residual earnings are
increasing when employer size increases (Abowd et al., 1999; Brown and Medoff, 1989;
Acs, 1999). Thus, the way that ability appears to mediate the effect of unemployment on
entry into self-employment may be the result of employer size rather than ability.
Only the latter of the two PSID samples contains information about employer size.
Therefore, the 1993-1995 sample is used to test the role of employer size on the previous
results. I first evaluate the effect of firm size without considering unemployment levels.
Consistent with the literature, I find that prior employment in a small firm dramatically
enhances the probability of entering into self-employment. However, interacting an
indicator for small firm size with ability, I find that employment in a small firm
stimulates self-employment only for individuals in groups A1 and A2 (i.e., those with
ability below the 50th percentile).
The results do not indicate any relationship between the probability of becoming selfemployed and employment in a small firm for high-ability individuals. The result
contrasts with the findings of Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008), who found a
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sizeable small-firm effect at the upper end of the ability distribution. Finally, I control
jointly for a small firm effect and the local unemployment rate in regressions run
separately by ability group.

Despite the modest sample sizes, the results are surprisingly sharp. For ability groups
A1 and A2, employment in small firms raises the probability of entry into selfemployment while variations in the local unemployment rate have no effect. In contrast,
there is no small firm effect among ability groups A3 through A5, but increases in the
local unemployment rate reduce the likelihood of entry into self-employment. As a result,
I find no robust evidence that necessity entrepreneurship is stimulated by increases in
local unemployment rates, but I do find evidence that opportunity entrepreneurship is
stifled by high unemployment.
This section is organized as follows: The second part describes data and methods
used, the third part presents results, and the last part concludes.
Data and Methods
I use two panels of data constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and local unemployment rates at the state level 2. My data contain 32,335
individuals in years 1978-1983 and 1993-1995. I add state unemployment rates to the
data. These two time periods are chosen because they have all information that I need for
2 Source: U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics
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this study. The 1978-1983 sample is chosen first to study the local unemployment effect.
The 1993-1995 sample is added to the study because of the lack of firm size data in the
first sample. Even though the 1993-1995 sample is small relative to the first one, it
enables me to control for both local unemployment and small firm effects simultaneously.
I use household heads in both samples because they are family members about whom the
greatest amount of information is available.

Table 1: Summary statistics of annual total labor income for
wage-earners and self-employed people for both samples.
1978-1983

1993-1995

WageEarners

SelfEmployed

WageEarners

SelfEmployed

Mean

15,770

19,334

22,543

37,435

Std. Dev.

10,452

20,304

24,067

58,748

25th
Percentile

7,140

6,419

10,568

9,891

50th
Percentile

13,713

13,160

25,858

29,288

75th
Percentile

17,660

18,040

33,015

40,533

90
Percentile

21,747

24,751

40,147

51,425

100th
Percentile

32,552

42,946

55,316

66,559

Observations

22,752

3,220

5,471

664

th

Since my purpose in this chapter is to estimate the impacts of some existing personal
12

characteristics and conditions on the probability of becoming self-employed, there are
both wage-earners and self-employed individuals in my samples. Incomes of wageearners and self-employed people are not the same. Summary statistics of annual total
labor income for wage-earners and self-employed individuals for different years are given
in Table 1. The distributions of annual labor incomes of household heads for both wage-

0

Density
.00001.00002.00003.00004.00005

earners and self-employed can be seen in Figure-1 and Figure-2 for two samples.

0

20000

40000
60000
Annual Total Labor Income

80000

wage-earners
self-employed

Figure-1: Distributions of income for wage-earners and self-employed; 1978-1983.

Figures 1, 2, and Table 1 show that mean incomes of self-employed people are
greater than those of wage-earners for both samples. The same is also true for the
variances. That is, the variances of incomes for self-employed individuals are larger than
those for wage-earners.
13

Density
0 5.000e-06
.00001
.000015
.00002
.000025
0

50000

100000
150000
Annual Total Labor Income

200000

250000

wage-earners
self-employed

Figure-2: Distributions of income for wage-earners and self-employed; 1993-1995.

Incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners at the 25 th
percentile and higher at the 90th percentile for the period of 1978-1983. Similarly,
incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners at the 25 th
percentile and higher at the 75th percentile for the period of 1993-1995.
The total labor income of an individual depends on individual characteristics like
age, gender, education, work experience, industry, occupation, state of residence, and
personal ability. We can measure age, gender, education, work experience, industry,
occupation, and state of residence but we cannot measure personal ability directly. There
are two way to measure ability used in literature. The first, which is used by Elfenbeim,
Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) holds the education level constant. They construct a
14

percentile rank in the skill distribution separately for people having the same highest
degree. They measure relative ability as the position of a given individual within the pay
distribution in a given year among individuals with the same highest degree. The method
used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) seems logical because we observe large
income differences among people having identical observable human capital. However,
this method ignores the impacts of work experience, age, gender, and state of residence
on personal labor income. These additional characteristics can also create large
differences in labor income. The one with more work experience can earn more than
others although all have identical highest degrees. Similarly, earnings of a person can be
different in two different cities even for people with same job.
The second way of measuring personal ability is to use residual income as a proxy.
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) use this method to determine ability levels of
individuals and therefore their relative positions in the skill distribution. This is a more
logical way of measuring ability level than the one used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and
Zenger (2008). It controls for the effects of age, gender, and education level on personal
labor income and uses the residual as a measure of ability. As Behrman and Rosenzweig
(1999) indicate, ability has been used as the rubric for all unmeasured earnings
endowments, which may include genetic endowments of ability, preschool human capital,
or motivation.
I also use residual income in this study as a proxy to determine the position of an
individual in the skill distribution. Unexplained incomes used in this chapter are residuals
15

from a regression of the logarithm of income on some observable individual variables.
These variables are occupation, industry, state of residence, age, gender, education level,
and work experience. A general form of the wage regression is given below.
Ln(income)i,t = α0 + α1 Xi + α2 Yi,t + εi,t

(1)

where the vector Xi represents a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, and the
vector Yi,t represents a set of time-varying individual characteristics of person-i in year-t.
As indicated by Garen (1984) and Weiss (1995), a regression of wage on education
results in biased coefficient estimates. Thus, I used Heckman two-step correction to
obtain unbiased parameters. Marital status and the number of children at home are used
in the selection equation in addition to the other variables. The first stage estimates,
presented in Part-B of Table 2, show that being married and having more education are
positively correlated and that more educated people have fewer children.

Table 2 also presents estimates of the wage regressions for both samples, which
includes 8 occupation, 10 industry, and 51 state of residence dummy variables in addition
to age, gender, education, and work experience explanatory variables in the wage
regressions. The results indicate that education raises earnings 3, work experience induces
higher incomes, and

males earn more than females. These are all familiar and

unsurprising results. The lambda terms are negative and statistically significant.

3 This positive correction between education and earning is also shown by Becker and Chiswick (1966),
Willis and Rosen (1979), Taubman and Wales (1974), and Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990).
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Table 2 : Labor Income Regressions for Both Samples
1978-1983
7.9309
(0.1290)

1993-1995
7.5821
(0.7840)

Age

0.0018**
(0.0015)

0.0049**
(0.0023)

Gender

0.5683***
(0.0123)

0.5749***
(0.0360)

Education

0.0580***
(0.0016)

0.0614***
(0.0071)

Work Experience

0.0107***
(0.0007)

0.0089***
(0.0031)

Lambda

- 0.3412***
(0.0261)

- 0.2013***
(0.0124)

0.3450

0.2408

Constant

R2

First Stage Estimates
Constant

0.2409**
(0.0431)

0.1413**
(0.0431)

Age

0.1703
(0.3100)

0.1529
(0.2123)

Gender

0.5380**
(0.2079)

0.6401**
(0.3085)

Married

0.1923*
(0.0192)

0.1804*
(0.0681)

- 0.4083**
(0.0240)

- 0.3110**
(0.0360)

- 0.1105
(0.2010)

- 0.2015
(0.3124)

R2

0.2941

0.2403

Observations

26,200

6,135

Number of Children
Work Experience

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions include 8 occupation,
10 industry, and 51 state of residence dummies.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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That is, the error terms in the selection and primary equations are negatively
correlated for both samples. Thus, unobserved factors that make participation more likely
tend to be associated with lower wages.

Table 3: Summary statistics of unexplained incomes
1978-1983

1993-1995

Wage-Earners Self-Employed Wage-Earners Self-Employed
Mean

0.015

- 0.121

0.0031

- 0.021

Std. Dev.

0.598

0.852

0.890

1.217

25th Percentile

-0.812

-0.853

-1.229

-1.202

50th Percentile

-0.062

-0.068

-0.034

-0.045

75th Percentile

0.204

0.259

0.430

0.326

90th Percentile

0.515

0.604

0.651

0.593

100th Percentile

0.876

1.037

1.287

1.449

Observations

22,752

3,220

4,312

603

Summary statistics of residual income for wage-earners and self-employed
individuals for different years are given in Table 3. The table 3 along with Figures 3 and
4, show that mean residual income for self-employed people is smaller than that for
wage-earners. However, the variance of unexplained income for self-employed people is
larger. Unexplained income of self-employed individuals is lower than that of wageearners at the 25th percentile and higher above the 90th percentile for both periods 19781983 and 1993-1995.
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Figure-3: Distributions of unexplained income for wage-earners and
self-employed; 1978-1983
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Figure-4: Distributions of unexplained income for wage-earners and
self-employed; 1993-1995
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5

As mentioned in the introduction, I use five ability groups to classify individuals in
my samples according to their positions in the skill distribution. People below the first
25th percentile of the skill distribution are in A1. Since they are at the lowest end, they are
called low-ability people in this chapter. People at the high end of the skill distribution
are classified as high-ability people. They constitute the top 10 % of the skill distribution.
People in between these two ends are divided into three additional groups as A2, A3, and
A4. Groups A2 and A3 contain the second and the third quantiles of the skill distribution,
respectively. People in A4 constitute the fifteen percent of the skill distribution above
those in A3.

Table-4: Summary statistics of Annual Total Labor Income for Small Firm
Employees and Self-Employed Individuals
1993-1995
Small Firm
Employees

Large Firm
Employees

Self-Employed

Mean

24,456

31,795

37,435

Std. Dev.

17,936

33,818

58,748

25th Percentile

11,264

10,186

9,891

50th Percentile

21,950

27,501

29,288

75th Percentile

29,779

34,681

40,533

90 Percentile

35,280

43,259

51,425

100th Percentile

40,378

66,522

66,559

Observations

1,127

3,735

664

th
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Since this chapter analysis the effect of the local unemployment rate on the
likelihood of entrepreneurship, unemployment rates of U.S states are added to the data
sets. The local unemployment effect is tested for the two samples with and without
considering ability levels of individuals. The results of these tests are presented in the
following section. In order to check the robustness of these results, I further control for
firm size. The PSID contains information about the number of employees in last firm an
individual worked in. I define a small firm as the one with fewer than 25 employees. The
only constraint is that information about the size of the previous employer is available
only for the 1993-1995 period. Thus, only the 1993-1995 data is used to control for firm

Density

0 5.000e-06
.00001.000015
.00002.000025

size.

0

50000

100000
150000
Annual Total Labor Income

200000

small firm employees
self-employed

Figure-5: Distributions of annual total labor income for small firms employees and
self-employed individuals
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Total labor incomes of small firm employees and self-employed people are not the
same. Figure-5 plots their distributions. Summary statistics of annual total labor incomes
for small-firm employees, large firm employees, and self-employed individuals are given
in Table 4. Figure 5 and Table 4 indicate that mean income of small-firm employees is
less than that of self-employed people, while the variance of incomes for self-employed
individuals is larger than that for small-firm employees. Incomes of self-employed
individuals are lower than those of wage-earners only at the 25 th percentile. When we
compare incomes of three groups presented in Table 4, we observe that large firm
employees earner more than small firm employees, whereas they earn less than selfemployed individuals. Incomes of small firm employees are greater than those of large
firm workers only at the 25th percentile.

I use year-pairs in my logistic regressions because my aim is to estimate the
probability of entry into self-employment from paid-work in the second year by
considering individual characteristics and conditions given in the first year. Three main
forms of my logistic regressions are given in equations (2), (3), and (4). The dependent
variable in each specification is equal to one if person-i is self-employed in the current
year and zero otherwise given that he/she was a wage-earner in the previous year.
Analogous to specification (1), Xi and Yi,t are two vectors used to test the impacts of
individual characteristics on the likelihood of entry into self-employment in all
regressions. While the vector Xi

represents a set of time-invariant individual

characteristics, the vector Yi,t represents a set of time-variant individual characteristics of
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person-i in year-t.

PR(SELi,t +1 = 1 | SELi,t = 0) = β0 + β1 Xi + β2 Yi,t + β3 LUi,t + εi,t +1

(2)

where LUi,t. is a vector consisting of the unemployment rate in year-t of the state of
residence of individual-i, and interactions4 of the unemployment rate with ability. The
effect of firm size is tested with the specification

PR(SELi,t +1 = 1 | SELi,t = 0) = θ0 + θ1 Xi + θ2 Yi,t + θ3 SFi,t + εi,t +1

(3)

where SFi,t is a vector consisting of a dummy equal to one if the employer in period-t had
lower than 25 employees, and again an interaction with ability. Finally, I simultaneously
control for unemployment and firm size with the following specification.

PR(SELi,t +1 = 1 | SELi,t = 0) = γ0 + γ1 Xi + γ2Yi,t + γ3Li,t + γ4Si,t + εi,t +1

(4)

The variables Li,t and Si,t represent U.S local unemployment rates and prior employer's
size. This regression is run for each ability group separately, so there are no interaction
terms.

4 Interaction terms are used in the regressions as described in Chunrong and Norton (2003).
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Results
The tables in this section exhibit results for the critical explanatory variables.
Estimates for occupation, industry, and state of residence variables are not reported
because they are not the main concern of this chapter. Estimated marginal effects for the
first two logistic regressions are given in Table 5 for 1978-1983, and in Table 6 for 19931995.

Table 5 provides logistic regression results for the period 1978-1983. Both
regressions include age, gender, education, and work experience as independent
variables. Results are very similar for these variables in both models. Age and education
are positively correlated with probability of becoming self-employed, while men are
more likely to become self-employed than women. There is also a positive correlation
between work experience and the probability of entering self-employment, but this
correlation is statistically insignificant.

The table also provides evidence about the effect of local unemployment rates on
the likelihood of entrepreneurship. Column (1) indicates that local unemployment rates
and the probability of entry into self-employment are positively correlated. Moreover, a
high local unemployment rate is a strong significant predictor of entrepreneurship.

24

Table 5 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1978-1983; (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year, 0 otherwise.
(1)

(2)

Age

0.0005**
(0.0002)

0.0003*
(0.0002)

Gender

0.0302***
(0.0037)

0.0297***
(0.0034)

Education

0.0010**
(0.0004)

0.0011***
(0.0004)

Work Experience

0.0001
(0.0002)

0.0001
(0.0002)

Local Unemployment Rates

0.0031***
(0.0008)

- 0.0001
(0.0013)

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
Local Unemployment Rates-A1
Local Unemployment Rates-A2
Local Unemployment Rates-A3
Local Unemployment Rates- A4
Local Unemployment Rates-A5
Pseudo R

2

Observations

----

0.0459***
(0.0110)

----

0.0091
(0.0119)

----

- 0.0084
(0.0122)

----

Dropped

----

0.0586***
(0.0127)

----

0.0025*
(0.0013)

----

0.0041***
(0.0014)

----

0.0052***
(0.0015)

----

0.0049***
(0.0016)

----

Dropped

0.0838

0.1070

22,848

22,848

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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Column (2) displays results from a deeper examination of the local unemployment
effect after considering five ability groups. Consistent with earlier literature, I find a
statistically significant positive correlation between local unemployment rates and the
probability of becoming self-employed for people at the lower end of the skill
distribution. In fact, the correlation between local unemployment rates and the likelihood
of being an entrepreneur is positive and statistically significant for individuals in all
ability groups except A5. In other words, high local unemployment rates are strong
predictors of entry into entrepreneurship for all but the most able individuals.

Consistent with the literature, I was expecting a negative correlation between local
unemployment rates and the probability of entry into self-employment for workers at
highest end of the skill distribution. Surprisingly, the estimates reveal no correlation
between them in A5.

Table 6 repeats results from the second sample. The effects of age, gender,
education, and work experience are similar to those found in the first sample. 5 Column
(1) of Table 6 shows that local unemployment rates have a positive, but statically
insignificant, influence on the transition of workers into self-employment. Estimates for
interaction terms between local unemployment rates and the five ability groups are
similar for the two samples, except for A4 and A5.
5

Education and work experience are both positively correlated with the probability of self-employment.
Estimates for them are statistically significant. Males are more likely to be self-employed than females but,
the estimate is statistically insignificant.
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Table 6 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995; (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year, 0 otherwise.
(1)
- 0.0005
(0.0004)

Age

(2)
- 0.0009***
(0.0003)

Gender

0.0071
(0.0064)

0.0063
(0.005)

Education

0.0040***
(0.0012)

0.0028***
(0.0009)

Work Experience

0.0011**
(0.0005)

0.0008**
(0.0003)

Local Unemployment Rates

0.0007
(0.0076)

- 0.0051
(0.0063)

----

Dropped

----

0.0045
(0.0341)

----

0.0038
(0.0292)

----

0.0354
(0.0299)

----

0.0260
(0.0279)

----

0.0050
(0.0043)

----

0.0006
(0.0053)

----

0.0031
(0.0046)

----

Dropped

----

- 0.0005
(0.0044)

Pseudo R2

0.0804

0.0782

Observations

4,187

5,375

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
Local Unemployment Rates-A1
Local Unemployment Rates-A2
Local Unemployment Rates-A3
Local Unemployment Rates-A4
Local Unemployment Rates-A5

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level *Significant at 10 % level
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That is, lower-ability individuals in A1, A2, and A3 are more likely to be selfemployed when local unemployment rates are high. However, the point estimates ones
for the second sample are statistically insignificant. There is no correlation between local
unemployment rates and the probability of self-employment for individuals in A4,
suggesting that this group is not affected by local unemployment in their entrepreneurial
decisions. Also contrary to the first sample, local unemployment rates and the probability
of transition into self-employment are negatively correlated for people in A5, although
these results are insignificant.

The insignificant results in the second sample may be the result of its smaller size.
Because, the first sample has six years of data, while the second sample has only has only
two years. I reduce demands on data in the second sample by dividing individuals into
just two ability groups: L. Group and H. Group. L. Group includes individuals having
ability levels up to the 90th percentile of the skill distribution, while H. Group includes
individuals in the top 10 percent. Table 7 reports outcomes of the same analysis done
before by using these two new ability groups. Unfortunately, this combination of ability
groups did not alter the results; There was no statistically significant result.
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Table 7 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995 (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year, 0 otherwise.
(1)

(2)

Age

- 0.0005
(0.0004)

Gender

0.0071
(0.0064)

0.0055
(0.0052)

Education

0.0040***
(0.0012)

0.0030***
(0.0009)

Work Experience

0.0011**
(0.0005)

0.0009**
(0.0003)

Local Unemployment Rates

0.0007
(0.0076)

- 0.0063
(0.0065)

L.Group (bottom 90%)

----

Dropped

H.Group (top 10%)

----

0.0166
(0.0244)

----

0.0034
(0.0034)

----

Dropped

Pseudo R2

0.0804

0.0657

Observations

4,187

5,375

Local Unemployment Rates-L.Group
Local Unemployment Rates-H.Group

- 0.0009***
(0.0003)

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level

The results suggest that local unemployment influences transitions of low-ability
individuals into self-employment but has no impact on the most able people. These
results may change if firm size is also controlled for in the regressions. Because
Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) indicate that size of the prior employer also
affects self-employment transitions of wage-earners significantly. They show that prior
employment in small firms increases the likelihood of self-employment relative to prior
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employment in larger firms. In particular, this implication is valid for workers having
positions at the lower and the upper tails of the skill distribution. In addition, it is known
that employment volatility is inversely related to firm size (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992;
Davis et al., 1996; Rob, 1995; Shaffer, 2006). As shown by Parker (2004) and Robbins,
Pantuosco, Parker, and Fuller (2000), large numbers of new jobs are created by small
firms6. However, these jobs tend to be less permanent than those created by large firms
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Davis et al., 1996; Rob, 1995). Moreover, we also know
that employer size and wage rates are positively correlated. That is, individuals having
higher residual earnings work for large firms (Abowd et al., 1999; Brown and Medoff,
1989; Acs, 1999). Namely, high-ability people are working for large firms rather than
small firms. Consequently, we can infer that low-ability workers are hired by local small
firms. Thus, low-ability individuals who are affected significantly from high local
unemployment in their self-employment transitions are also more likely to be employees
of small firms. Therefore, the observed positive correlation between local unemployment
rates and the likelihood of entrepreneurship for low-skilled workers may be the result of a
small firm effect.

The possibility of small-firm effect leads me to check the robustness of my results
by controlling for firm size. To do so, I first analyze the role of prior employment in small
firms in self-employment transitions of wage-earners at various skill levels (Table 8).

6 In fact, their contributions to job creation are greater than those of large firms (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1992).
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Table 8 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995; (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year, 0 otherwise.
(1)

(2)

- 0.0009***
(0.0003)

- 0.0005
(0.0003)

Gender

0.0051
(0.0051)

0.0081
(0.0055)

Education

0.0031***
(0.0009)

0.0036***
(0.0010)

Work Experience

0.0009**
(0.0003)

0.0009**
(0.0004)

Small-Firm

0.0175***
(0.00473)

- 0.0146
(0.0157)

----

- 0.0177
(0.0109)

----

- 0.0544***
(0.0116)

----

- 0.0138*
(0.0082)

----

0.0005
(0.0078)

----

Dropped

----

0.0399**
(0.0173)

----

0.0657***
(0.0188)

----

0.0241
(0.0178)

----

0.0074
(0.0185)

----

Dropped

Pseudo R2

0.0722

0.1152

Observations

5,375

4,187

Age

A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
Small Firm Employees in A1
Small Firm Employees in A2
Small Firm Employees in A3
Small Firm Employees in A4
Small Firm Employees in A5

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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Then, I test both the local unemployment effect and the small firm effect
simultaneously for each ability group (Table 9). Only one sample, 1993-1995, is used for
this analysis.

Effects of personal characteristics like age, gender, education, and work experience
are again controlled for in the logistic regressions presented in Table 8. 7 The dummy
variable “Small-Firm” identifies prior employment in small firms. The estimate
associated with this variable indicates that prior employees of small firms are, on
average, more likely to be self-employed. My results are consistent with the findings of
Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008).

To analyze the “small firm” effect in more detail, I add in column (2) of Table 8
interaction terms that allow for separate small firm effects in each ability group.
Employees of small firms in A1 and A2 are more likely to be entrepreneurs. Moreover,
the associated marginal effects are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels for
individuals in A1 and A2, respectively. Evidently, prior employment in small firms is a
strong predictor of self-employment for individuals in lower ability groups. Although
workers in A3 and A4 show the same positive correlation between the probability of
entering self-employment and employment in small firms, the coefficients are all

7
Estimates are statistically significant for age, education level, and work experience but insignificant
for gender. While education and work experience are positively correlated with the likelihood of selfemployment, age is negatively correlated. That is, more work experience and high education level are
significant predictors of entrepreneurship.
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statistically insignificant.

Table 9 : Probability of Becoming Self-Employed, 1993-1995; (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable = 1 if self-employed in current year, 0 otherwise.
Sub-samples by Ability Groups

Age

Gender

Education

Work
Experience
Small
Firm

Unemp.
Rate

Full
Sample

A1

A2

A3

A4

A

- 0.0004
(0.0004)

- 0.0006
(0.0013)

0.0006
(0.0005)

- 0.0032**
(0.0012)

- 0.0003
(0.0014)

- 0.0013***
(0.0004)

0.0059
(0.0063)

0.0052
(0.0193)

- 0.0015
(0.0090)

- 0.0013
(0.0150)

0.0462**
(0.0234)

0.0149*
(0.0089)

0.0040*** 0.0076*
(0.0012) (0.0041)

0.0019
(0.0020)

0.0065**
(0.0032)

0.0035
(0.0036)

0.0019
(0.0014)

0.0010** 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0016)

- 0.0008
(0.0006)

0.0048***
(0.0014)

0.0014
(0.0015)

0.0005
(0.0005)

0.0111
(0.0129)

- 0.0114
(0.0169)

0.0157
(0.0179)

0.0174*** 0.0333** 0.0296***
(0.0052) (0.0155) (0.0104)

0.0017
(0.0074)

0.0004
(0.0097)

- 0.0038
(0.0037)

- 0.0138** - 0.0253*** - 0.0134***
(0.0067)
(0.0096)
(0.0043)

Pseudo R2

0.0877

0.1309

0.2636

0.1780

0.2357

0.1526

Observations
.

4,187

723

563

715

451

1,108

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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Entry into self-employment does not depend on prior employment in local small
firms in the A5. The result contrasts with the findings of Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and
Zenger (2008) who found that those entering into self-employment from small firms are
drawn from both the upper and the lower tails of the skill distribution, and the association
is much stronger for those from the upper tail of the distribution.

My findings, however, indicate that those entering into self-employment from small
firms are drawn from the lower tail of the skill distribution, and the association is stronger
for individuals in A2 than the ones in A1.

A logistic regression model is run for each ability group separately. Explanatory
variables representing personal characteristics, prior employment in small firms, and
local unemployment rates are included. The associated estimates are displayed in Table 9.
8

Since I control for both local unemployment and small firm effects for each ability

group in the last analysis, I can observe relative strengths of these effects at each ability
level.

8

Estimates imply that education and work experience are positively correlated with the probability of
being self-employed for all individuals from all ability levels. Both high level of education and more work
experience are statistically significant predictors of self-employment however significance level of
education is greater than that of work experience. Males are more likely to be self-employed than females
at all ability levels. Estimates for gender are statistically significant only for individuals in A4 and A5.
While high education level is a significant predictor of self-employment for workers in A1 and A3, more
work experience is a significant predictors of self-employment only for those in A3. Only significant
estimates for age are the ones for people in A3 and A5. These two results show negative correlations
between age and probability of entry into entrepreneurship. That is, individuals in A3 and A5 are more
likely to be self-employed when they are younger.
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Column (1) uses the full sample. Small firm employment raises the likelihood of
transition into self-employment. The estimated marginal effect is statistically significant
at the 1% level. Therefore, it can be inferred that prior employment in small firms is a
strong predictor of self-employment. Local unemployment has no significant effect on
the probability of entry into self-employment. These results hold for sub-samples A1 and
A2 as indicated by columns (2) and (3). This indicates that local unemployment is not a
condition forcing low-ability workers into necessity entrepreneurship. The small firm
effect is much stronger for them. Thus, it can be said that previously observed positive
correlations between local unemployment rates and probability of being self-employed
for low-skilled individuals are mostly due to the small firm effect.

On the other hand, prior employment in small firms has no influence on the
likelihood of self-employment for workers in A3, A4, and A5. That is, there is no small
firm effect for high-ability people constituting the upper 50 % of the skill distribution.
However, these highly-skilled individuals are less likely to be entrepreneurs when local
unemployment rates are high. In other words, opportunity entrepreneurship is affected
negatively by high local unemployment. Associated significance levels, 5 % for A3 and 1
% for other two groups, point out that these results are strong although sample size is
moderate. In fact, it is the strongest for the top 25 % of the skill distribution. Since it is
consistent with the literature, this outcome is as expected. It suggests that opportunity
entrepreneurs postpone or cancel their self-employment plans when there are high
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unemployment rates.

Conclusion

This chapter presents results obtained after investigating the existence of a local
unemployment effect on entry into self-employment. Initially, I showed that the
probability of entry into self-employment is increasing in the local unemployment rate.
Moreover, the correlation between local unemployment rates and the probability of entry
into self-employment was found to be positive for all but the top 10 % of the skill
distribution. For the top 10 % of the skill distribution, there is no correlation between
them. These results for low-ability workers are consistent with the theory of necessity
entrepreneurship. The literature indicates that individuals with lower ability levels
become necessity entrepreneurs because they are forced into entrepreneurship by some
external factors. From the estimates presented in this chapter, high local unemployment
appears to be one of these external factors. The literature suggests that high-ability people
are more likely to be opportunity entrepreneurs, and I conjectured that they could be
discouraged by high local unemployment. The initial results provided no support for this
conjecture. However, the initial results may be confounded by the absence of a control
for firm size.

Low-ability individuals are more likely to be employees of small firms, prior
employment in small firms increases the likelihood of entrepreneurship, and small firms
are more sensitive to the economic fluctuations that cause changes in unemployment
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rates. Therefore, the observed positive correlation between local unemployment rates and
the probability of self-employment for low-skilled workers may be due to a small firm
effect. In order to explore this possibility, I checked the robustness of my results by
controlling for employment in small firms. Analysis of the small firm effect shows that
prior employment in small firms, on average, increases the probability of entry into selfemployment. This inference is consistent with the literature. When this effect is tested by
considering different skill levels of people, it is observed that prior employment in small
firms is positively correlated with the likelihood of self-employment for workers in the
first four ability groups, although estimates for A3 and A4 are statistically insignificant.
For high-ability individuals, however, there is no correlation between the probability of
self-employment and employment in small firms. Thus, my findings are consistent with
the earlier literature only for low-skilled workers.

Last, I test the local unemployment effect and small firm effect simultaneously for
each ability group. The results are highly significant despite the moderate sample size.
While prior employment in small firms increases the likelihood of self-employment
significantly, local unemployment rates have almost no effect for low-ability workers in
A1 and A2. This means that high unemployment is not one of the factors forcing these
low-skilled workers into necessity entrepreneurship. The small firm effect has a greater
impact on their self-employment transitions than local unemployment effect. In contrast,
these results are not valid for more skilled individuals in A3, A4 and A5. The estimates
show that prior employment in small firms has no influence on the probability of
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becoming self-employed for them. Instead, their likelihood of entrepreneurship is
affected significantly by high local unemployment. Moreover, it is consistent with the
literature that this impact is negative. Thus, high-ability workers in A3, A4, and A5 are
less likely to be self-employed when local unemployment rates are high. That is,
opportunity entrepreneurship is reduced by high unemployment.
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III. CHAPTER 2 : ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL AND BARRIERS TO
FIRM FORMATION
Introduction

This chapter investigates how organizational capital constitutes a barrier to firm
formation by individuals at different skill levels over time. As indicated in the literature,
entrepreneurial behaviors of people having distinct ability levels are not the same. In
particular, individuals at the lower and upper ends of the skill distribution are more likely
to be self-employed Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger,(2008). This means that these lowand high-ability people are the ones who establish firms that are crucial for the economy.
Therefore, analyzing factors that cause changes in the occupational decisions over time,
and that affect firm formation activities of individuals from various ability groups is an
important topic to study.

In this section, organizational capital refers to human capital and physical capital.
As indicated by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002), production requires not only such
traditional factors as capital and labor but also skills, organizational structures and
processes, culture, and other factors collectively referred to “intangible assets”. These
intangible assets are often large in magnitude and have important productivity benefits. In
addition, Hubbard and O'Brien (2009) define human capital as the accumulated training
and skills that workers possess. Therefore, estimated personal ability or skill level of
individuals which is also within the intangible assets is taken as human capital in this
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chapter. The amount of organizational capital required for firm formation depends on the
type of industry which will be chosen for the new firm. In other words, whether the
industry is an ability-intensive industry or a capital-intensive industry is an important
criteria for a potential entrepreneur to consider while founding a firm 9. A capital-intensive
industry refers to an industry requiring substantial amount of investments in capital
assets, and consequently requires more liquidity for the production of goods. An abilityintensive industry, however, is an industry requiring more human capital instead of
monetary capital for the production of goods. Since people have different skill levels 10
and different amounts of initial wealth11, required organizational capital for the new firm
could become an entry barrier for them.

In order to explore the role of organizational capital in firm formation, I first
construct a model simulating interactions among a representative utility maximizing
agent and his/her profit maximizing firm. Second, I analyze testable implications of my
model empirically. Both industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, require
funds for investment spending in the model. However, the amount of funds necessary for
a capital-based firm is greater than funds necessary for an ability-based firm. Moreover,
high human capital is also necessary for an ability-based firm. Thus, high skill
requirements induce the most able individuals to found firms in an ability-intensive
industry. Firm formation by individuals in distinct places of the skill distribution depend
9
10
11

Bates (1990) indicates the importance of human capital as an input in entrepreneurial activities.
As indicated by Jovanovic (1994), personal skills affect firm formation activities of individuals.
Lack of high initial wealth constitutes a liquidity constraint for people in my study. As implied by
Jovanovic and Evans (1989), liquidity constraint affects entrepreneurial choice.
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on their initial wealth and saving behavior. That is, if they have high initial wealth, and if
the monetary return from a capital-intensive industry is greater than those from an abilityintensive industry and paid-work, then they prefer to found firms in a capital-intensive
industry when young. Another option of self-employment for young individuals who do
not have high initial wealth but enough liquidity is to form a firm in an ability-intensive
industry if their skill levels allow. If the monetary return from an ability-intensive
industry is greater than those from a capital-intensive industry and paid-work, then they
found new ventures in an ability-intensive industry in the first period of their life even
though their initial wealth are limited. Otherwise, they stay at their current jobs and save
to accumulate the required funds for investment in a capital-intensive or an abilityintensive industry. These people establish their own firms in the second period of their
life by using their savings.

In order to analyze the testable predictions of my theoretical model, observations on
a sample of individuals in the PSID are used. A panel is constructed for the period 20032007. This time period is selected for the sample because it includes all information
needed for the analysis.

A significant empirical challenge is to construct measures of personal ability. For
this purpose, I construct an indicator for innate ability from the residuals obtained in a
regression of labor earnings on age, gender, education, and work experience (cf. Behrman
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and Rosenzweig, 1999). Education is not taken as a part of ability because two people
having the same education level can earn different incomes even though they both do
identical jobs as a result of their distinct personal abilities. Individuals are placed in four
ability groups, denoted by G1 through G4, with G1 representing the lowest ability group.
These are not quantiles. Group G1 accounts for the first 25 percent of the observations,
G2 accounts for the next thirty five percent, G3 accounts for the next thirty percent, and
G5 represents the highest ten percent.

Mixed empirical results about the predictions of the model are observed. That is,
high-ability individuals in G4 have the greatest monetary return from their personal
ability levels if they found ability-based firms whereas, they have the least monetary
return if they become paid-employees. Thus, more personal ability makes them more
likely to establish ability-based firms. In contrast, low-ability individuals in G1 have the
greatest monetary return from their personal ability levels if they choose to be paidemployees. In other words, their low personal ability constitutes an entry barrier to an
ability-intensive industry. However, it is empirically shown that they are more likely to
work as wage-earners than to found their own firms when personal ability level increases.
Both industry types require investment spending for firm formation although it is less for
an ability-intensive industry. This means that liquidity constrained people face entry
barriers in both industries. Therefore, high wealth makes individuals more likely to found
capital-based and ability-based firms. Since liquidity constraints faced by young
individuals can be removed by using savings when old, entry into both industries is
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predicted to increase with age. Empirical results indicate that entry into an abilityintensive industry often happens later in life. This result is valid especially for individuals
in G1 and G2. Entry into a capital-intensive industry is also more likely to happen later in
life for individuals in G1, but not for those in G3 and G4.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theoretical model, section 3
exhibits testable implications of the model, section 4 shows empirical analysis, and the
last section offers some concluding remarks.

The Model
The Environment:

I consider an agent that lives for two periods. The agent has two occupational
alternatives during his life. He/She can form his/her own firm or be a paid-worker 12. If
the agent decides to establish a firm, he/she has to choose which industry to enter in order
to maximize his/her firm's profit Π which is presented in equation (16). There are two
types of industries, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, that can be chosen for the new
firm. A capital-intensive industry refers to an industry that needs a substantial amount of
investment in capital assets. Therefore, it requires more liquidity for the production of
goods. An ability-intensive industry, in contrast, is an industry that needs more human
capital than physical capital for the production. Since the agent chooses the industry that
12 That is, this representative agent can supply his labor either by as a worker or as an entrepreneur
[Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979)].
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yields maximum earning for his own firm, profit of his firm becomes earning function of
the industry chosen for the firm as shown in the Firm's Problem section. Production in
both industries depends on a time-invariant heterogeneous personal ability level, A,
which raises entrepreneurial earning f. Their earning functions have the same general
form as follows:

f ij=k ij A γ ij

(5)

where

{

i= 1 if
2 if

{

j= 1
2

if
if

industry type is a capital-intensive industry
industry type is an ability-intensive industry

current period is the first period
current period is the second period

}

}

In equation (5), γij and kij denote the marginal product of personal ability and the amount
of capital required for industry-i in period-j, respectively.

Assumption 1 :

k1j > k2j > 0. That is, both capital-intensive and ability-intensive

industries need positive capital for the production. However, a capital-intensive industry
requires more capital investment than an ability-intensive industry.

The capital necessary for industry-i is a fixed cost of establishing a firm in industry-i.
Therefore, it constitutes an entry condition for that particular industry.
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Assumption 2 : 0 < γ1j < γ2j. The marginal product of personal ability is greater for an
ability-intensive industry than that for a capital-intensive industry.
If the agent chooses to be a paid-employee, he earns a wage given by equation (6).

W =W 0 A γ

(6)

where W0 is the base wage, and γ is the marginal contribution of personal ability to the
wage. The wage is composed of two parts. The first part is the base wage which is set
according to personal characteristics like age, gender, education, and work experience.
The second part is directly proportional to the employee's personal ability level A.

Assumption 3 : γ < γ1j < γ2j . That is, the marginal contribution of personal ability level
to the wage is less than marginal contributions of personal ability level to entrepreneurial
earnings.

Analysis of the Environment:

Graphs of the wage and two production functions are presented in Figure-6. In this
figure,

k1j represents physical capital investment necessary for a capital-intensive

industry in period-j whereas, k2j represents physical capital investment necessary for an
ability-intensive industry in period-j.
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A

Figure-6: Production functions of two industry types and wage

The variable A*, given in equation (7), is the critical personal ability level at which
two industry types yield the same entrepreneurial earnings after firm formation. It is
given by

A *=

k 1j −k 2j
j

j

γ 2 −γ 1

(7)

Individuals with personal ability level greater than A * are classified as high-ability
individuals in this chapter. Since A* is the ability level at which having a capital-based
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firm and having an ability-based firm yield identical incomes, future entrepreneurs are
indifferent between the two industry alternatives at this point. It is more profitable to have
a venture in an ability-intensive industry for people whose personal ability levels are
greater than A* as indicated by Figure-1. The high ability level requirement of an abilitybased firm does not constitute a barrier for them because they are already high-ability
individuals. This result for high-ability people is presented in Result 1.

Result 1 : f2j > f1j when A > A*. That is, having a firm in an ability-intensive industry
brings greater monetary return than having a firm in a capital-intensive industry for highability people whose personal ability levels are greater than A*.

The model implies that having a capital-based firm is more profitable for people
whose personal ability levels are less than A *. Since these individuals do not have the
high human capital necessary for an ability-based firm, they are constrained by the
required high ability level. Therefore, setting up a capital-based firm brings more earning
for them. Result 2 presents this result.

Result 2 : f2j < f1j when A < A*. That is, having a firm in a capital-intensive industry
brings greater entrepreneurial income than having a firm in an ability-intensive industry
for people having personal ability levels less than A*.
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There are two more break-even personal ability levels as A 1 and A2. A1 represents a
personal ability level at which wage and earning from a capital-intensive firm are equal
after the firm is formed. Similarly, A 2 shows a personal ability level at which the wage
and earnings from an ability-intensive firm are same after firm formation. They are as
follows:

A1=

W 0−k 1j
γ 1j −γ

and

A 2=

W 0−k 2j
γ 2j −γ

(8)

Result 3 : A2 > A1 . That is, cut-off personal ability level between wage and earning from
an ability-based firm is greater than cut-off personal ability level between wage and
earning from a capital-based firm.

People having personal ability levels less than A 1 are classified to be low-ability
individuals in this chapter. Since A 1 is the ability level at which wage and earning from a
capital-based firm are the same, people are indifferent between being paid-employees and
having firms in a capital-intensive industry at this ability level. However, their decisions
change along with the positions of their personal ability levels with respect to A 1. That is,
they prefer to have capital-based firms if their personal ability levels are greater than A 1.
Since being a firm-owner in a capital-intensive industry yields higher income than being
a paid-employee for them, they enter into a capital-intensive industry by founding firms.
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This means that having personal ability level less than A 1 constitutes an entry barrier to a
capital-intensive industry. In other words, it is not profitable to set up a capital-based firm
for the ones whose positions are at the lowest end of the skill distribution because of their
lower human capital. Result 4 states this result.

Result 4 : f1j > W when A > A1. That is, being a firm-owner in a capital-intensive
industry brings greater monetary return than being a paid-employee for people whose
personal ability levels are greater than A1.

Analogous to A 1, A2 is the personal ability level at which wage and earning from an
ability-based firm are identical. This means that people are indifferent between being
paid-employees and having firms in an ability-intensive industry at this ability level.
However, they decide to have ability-based firms if their personal ability levels are
greater than A2. Since being firm-owners in an ability-intensive industry yields greater
earning than being paid-employees for them, they enter into an ability-intensive industry
by setting up new firms. This means that having personal ability level less than A2
constitutes an entry barrier for an ability-intensive industry. This outcome can be seen in
Result 5.

Result 5 : f2j > W when A > A 2. That is, being a firm-owner in an ability-intensive
industry brings greater earning than being a paid-employee for people whose personal
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ability levels are greater than A2.

The three critical ability levels, A 1, A2, and A*, divide individuals into four ability
groups for which the best occupational choices are different. As described earlier, people
whose personal ability levels are greater than A* are classified as high-ability individuals
whereas, others whose personal ability levels are less than A1 are classified as low-ability
individuals. Being a paid-employee is the best way of earning more income.
Consequently it is the best occupational choice for low-ability people. On the other hand,
since having a firm in an ability-intensive industry is the way to earn the greatest income
for high-ability individuals, it is the best occupational alternative for them. Results 6 and
7 state these results for low-ability and high-ability individuals, respectively.

Result 6 : W > f1j > f2j when A1 > A. That is, being a paid-employee brings the greatest
monetary return for low-ability people whose personal ability levels are less than A1.

Result 7 : f2j > f1j > W when A > A* > A2 > A1. That is, having a firm in an abilityintensive industry brings the greatest income for high-ability people whose personal
ability levels are greater than A*.

Having a firm in a capital-intensive industry is the way to earn the highest income for
the two groups of people with personal ability levels between A 1 and A*. However, since
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capital-intensive industry requires more spending for physical investment, their
occupational choices depend on the amounts of their initial wealth. Results 8 and 9
present results for these two ability groups.

Result 8 : f1j > f2j > W when A* > A > A2 > A1. That is, having a firm in a capitalintensive industry brings the greatest monetary return for people having personal ability
levels between A2 and A*.

Result 9 : f1j > W > f2j when A2 > A > A1. That is, having a firm in a capital-intensive
industry brings the greatest earning for people having personal ability levels between A 2
and A1.

Household's Problem:

The agent lives for two periods. He is born with one unit of labor time. As it can be
seen from the objective function, he gets utility from both first-period and second-period
consumptions C1 and C2. He makes a consumption-saving decision in the first period.
That is, he saves some portion of his first period income M1 whereas, he consumes all of
his second period income M2 as indicated by two budget constraints (10) and (11).
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Max U =lnC 1 β ln C 2 

(9)

subject to
C 1S =M 1

(10)

C 2=M 2

(11)

where
M 1=Max {Π 1i θ−k 1i ,W θ }

(12)

{

Π 211r θS −k 11  if A Capital-Based Firm-Owner in the First Period
M 2= Π 21r θS −k 1  if An Ability-Based Firm-Owner in the First Period
2
2
Max {Π 2i 1r θS −k 2i  , W 1r θS } if Wage-Earner in the First Period

}

(13)

where θ, S, and r denote initial wealth, saving, and interest rate. There is no borrowing.

Assumption 4 : Initial wealth, θ, is positive at the beginning of the first period.

The agent's incomes in the first and the second periods depend on the decision of
setting up a firm or staying as a wage-earner. That is, if he owns a firm, his income will
mainly be the profit, Π, of his firm. Profit of his firm depends on the selected industry as
shown by equation (20). However, if he works as a paid-employee, his income will
mainly be his wage. The decision to found a firm means spending some part of initial
wealth for investment. The amount of investment required depends on the industry
chosen for the new venture. A capital-intensive industry requires more physical investment,
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while an ability-intensive industry requires less physical investment. Thus, the amount of initial
wealth must be high enough for the chosen industry.

Assumption 5 : There is no perfect foresight in the model. In other words, the agent
does not see or predict the second period cases. Occupational decisions are made at the
beginnings of the first and the second periods.

The decision to found a firm or stay in the current job is made by the household at
the beginning of each period. In particular, if the household founds his own firm at the
beginning of the first period, his first period income will be profit of his firm plus part of
his initial wealth left after paying for investment. However, if he decides to stay in his
current paid-work, his income will be his wage plus his initial wealth. As shown by
equation (12), self-employment decision therefore the first period income level depends
on relative magnitudes of entrepreneurial and paid-work earnings. That is, if monetary
return from being a firm-owner is greater than that from a paid-work, he founds his own
firm. Monetary return from being a firm-owner depends on the industry chosen for the
new venture. Earning from an ability-based firm is greater for high-ability individuals
even though they have less wealth. On the other hand, monetary return from a capitalbased firm is greater for people having lower ability but more wealth.

Assumption 6 : If the agent decides to found a firm in one of the industry types in his
first period of life, he continues operating the same firm in the second period. In other
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words, there is no switch from one industry to the other industry while becoming selfemployed.

As implied by equation (13), the second period income of the agent depends on his
occupational decision made in the first period. That is, if he has his own firm when
young, he continues operating the same firm when old. In this case, his total income is his
profit plus his total wealth which includes some part of his initial wealth left after
investment payment and his saving plus interest earning from his total wealth. However,
if he does not have his own firm in the first period, he can found it or can stay as a wageearner in the second period. Since he is old now and worked when young, he has savings
that increased his total wealth. That is, if he could not establish his own firm because of
limited liquidity when young, he has an opportunity to found it now when old. The
decision about up his own firm in the second period also depends on the magnitudes of
monetary returns from self-employment and paid-work. If his total income from staying
as a wage-earner is greater, then he chooses to continue as an employee. But, if the return
from having a firm is greater, he has to decide which industry to enter. Since he has more
funds now, he has an opportunity to remove the barriers to founding a firm in a capitalintensive or in an ability-intensive industry. However if he wants his new firm to be in an
ability-intensive industry, he has to consider his own ability level in addition to his
wealth. That is, his personal ability level can constitute another entry barrier to an abilityintensive-industry. If he has lower personal ability, founding his own firm in a capitalintensive industry brings more monetary return. But, if he is a high-ability person
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meaning that he also has high human capital necessary for an ability-based firm, he can
choose either the capital-intensive or the ability-intensive industry for the new firm.
When the household's problem is solved for C1, S, and C2, as shown by Appendix-III, the
following results are obtained.

  



(14)

  

β
1
M 1
Y
1 β
1 β1r  2



(15)

C 2=



(16)

if
if
if
if
if

A A1
A1 A A2
A2 A A*
A1 AA 2
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A2 A A

C 1=
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M 1
Y
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M 1
Y
1 β
1 β 2
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{

W θ
1
1
П 1θ−k 1
M 1= П 12θ−k 12
W θ
W θ
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1

, A2 A A and k 1θ
and A*A and k 12θk 11
1
and k 1θ
*
1
, A A and k 2θ
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}

(17)

{

W 1r θ
Π 211r θ−k 11 
Y 2= Π 221r θ−k 12 
Π 211r θ−k 21 
Π 221r θ−k 22 

if
if
if
if
if

A A1
A1A A2
A2A A*
A1 A A2
A2A A*

, A2A A* and k 11θ
and A* A and k 12θk 11
and k 11θ
, A* A and k 12θ

}

(18)

The variables C1, C2, and S indicate that the consumption and saving behavior of the
agent depends on personal ability and initial wealth. The results for C1, C2, and S are
calculated in terms of M1 and Y2 whose values differ along with personal ability and
initial wealth. The variable M1 denotes the first-period income whereas, Y2 denotes the
second period income without saving. That is, Y2 includes the wage or profit of the new
firm depending on the chosen second-period occupation, and initial wealth or the amount
of initial wealth left after investment payment with interest earned from them. However,
M2 given in equation (19) shows total second-period income that also contains saving and
interest earning it brings.

{

W 1r θS 
2
1
П 11r θ−k 1S 
2
1
M 2= П 21r θ−k 2S 
2
2
П 11r θ−k 1S 
2

2

П 21r θ−k 2S 

*

*

2

if
if
if
if

AA1 , A2 A A , A  A , A1A A2 and k 2θS
*
A1AA2 and A2 AA
*
*
A2 AA , A  A
A1 AA2 , A2 AA* and θS k 21

if

A2 AA , A  A and k 2θS k 1

*

*
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2

2

}

(19)

Individuals whose personal ability levels are less than A1 do not change their
occupations over time. That is, low-ability people with personal ability levels less than A1
become wage-earners both in the first and the second periods of their lives. Because, they
earn the greatest income by being paid-employees as indicated by Result-6. M1 shows
that low-ability people's income in the first period consists of wage and initial wealth.
And their second-period income contains wage, initial wealth, saving, and interest earned
from both initial wealth and saving.

Since high-ability individuals whose personal ability levels are greater than A* have
the greatest monetary return from being entrepreneurs in an ability-intensive industry as
shown by Result-7, their best choice is to be ability-based firm-owners in both periods of
their lives. However, this can be achieved only if initial wealth is greater than k21 which is
the capital necessary for ability-based firm formation in the first period. Thus, if they
have enough liquidity for an ability-intensive industry, their M1 includes profit of the
ability-based firm and the amount left from initial wealth after investment spending for
the new firm. M2 contains profit of the ability-based firm, amount left from initial wealth
after investment spending done in the first period for the new firm, saving, and their
interest earnings. If they do not have enough money to create an ability-based firm, they
become wage-earners in the first period. After working as paid-employees in the first
period, their second-period employment choices depend on their total second-period
wealth. Total second-period wealth is composed of initial wealth and saving. If the
amount of capital needed for an ability-based firm formation is less than their total
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second-period wealth, they become ability-based firm-owners. Therefore, their M1 is
wage plus initial wealth. And their M2 includes profit of the ability-based firm, amount
left from initial wealth and saving after investment spending done in the second period
for the new firm, and their interest earnings. On the other hand, if their total secondperiod wealth is less than k22, they continue working as paid-employees in the second
period. In this case, M1 consists of wage and initial wealth. And M2 contains wage, initial
wealth, saving, and interest earned from both initial wealth and saving.

Wealth
Self-Employment in a
Capital-Intensive Industry
k1j
Self-Employment in an

Ability-Intensive Industry
k2j

Paid-Work

A1

A*

A2
Personal Ability

Figure-7: Occupational Choices According to Initial Wealth and Personal Ability
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Occupational choices of individuals according to wealth and personal ability are
also shown in Figure-7 given above 13. For people having personal ability levels between
A1 and A2, there are three optimal solutions. In the first solution, they choose to establish
firms in a capital-intensive industry when young and continue operating the same firms
when old. They choose to be capital-based firm-owners in both periods of their lives
because Result-9 proves that this choice supplies the greatest income for them. M1 and
M2 have two-period-profits of the capital-based firm and an amount left from initial
wealth after investment spending undertaken in the first period together with its interest
earning. Saving plus interest is also in M2. Since a capital-intensive industry requires
more investment, a high amount of initial wealth is necessary for this solution.
Consequently, liquidity constrained individuals become wage-earners when young, and
then they found capital-based firms by using their savings when old in the second
solution. They choose to be wage-earners in the first period in this solution because being
a wage-earner brings greater monetary return than being an ability-based firm-owner for
them as shown by Result-9. Moreover, there is no switch from one industry to the other
industry while becoming self-employed as stated in Assumption-6. The first-period
income, M1, for this solution consists of wage and initial wealth. The second-period
income, on the other hand, has profit of the capital-based firm plus total wealth which
includes an amount of funds left from the initial wealth and saving after investment
spending, and interest saving yields. For the second solution to exist, required capital
13 Since occupational decisions are made at the beginnings of the first and second periods, wealth in this
figure refers to the amount of funds people have at the beginning of each period. In other words, wealth
denotes initial wealth at the beginning of the first period whereas, it denotes initial wealth plus saving at the
beginning of the second period.

59

investment spending for a capital-based firm should be less than saving and initial wealth.
Therefore, if this condition does not hold, individuals in this ability interval continue to
be paid-employees in the second period. As a result, their M1 values include wage and
initial wealth whereas, their M2 becomes summation of wage, initial wealth, saving, and
interests earned from both initial wealth and saving.

There are five optimal solutions for the last group of people whose personal ability
levels are greater than A2 and less than A*. They have the same occupations in both
periods of their lives in the first and the second solutions. That is, people in this ability
interval choose to found capital-based firms when young and continue operating them
when old in the first solution. And they set up firms in an ability-intensive industry when
young and continue with the same firms when old in the second solution. Not all these
individuals choose to set up firms in a capital-intensive industry although Result-8 proofs
that it is the most profitable outcome for them. That is, ones with high initial wealth
choose to found capital-based firms whereas, others with less wealth but enough liquidity
for an ability-intensive industry choose to found ability-based firms. That is, an abilityintensive industry also requires liquidity but it is not as high as the wealth necessary for a
capital-intensive industry. Since Assumption-6 states that there is no switch from one
industry to the other industry while becoming self-employed, these people whose initial
wealth is less for a capital-based firm but enough for an ability-based firm do not choose
to form firms in an ability-intensive industry in the first period, and then establish firms
in a capital-intensive industry in the second period. In other words, they cannot switch
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from an ability-intensive industry to a capital-intensive industry. Moreover, individuals
having initial wealth which is not high enough for a capital-intensive industry do not
choose to be wage-earners even though they have enough initial wealth for an abilitybased firm with the aim of establishing capital-based firms in the second period by using
their savings. Because, there is no perfect foresight in the model. In other words, the
agent does not see or predict the second-period cases as indicated by Assumption-5.
Occupational decisions are made at the beginnings of the first and the second periods
without future intentions. M1 and M2 of the first solution include two-period-profits of the
capital-based firm and amount left from initial wealth after investment spending done in
the first period for the new firm. Analogously, M1 and M2 of the second solution contain
two-period-profits of the ability-based firm and the amount left from initial wealth after
investment spending for the new firm. Savings together with interests earned from
savings and the amount of wealth left are also in M2 values of these two solutions. Other
three cases show another option for individuals having liquidity less than the one
necessary for an ability-based firm formation. They indicate that people in this ability
group are wage-earners in the first period. Thus, M1 for these cases is wage plus initial
wealth. However, the second period occupations are different for these last three
solutions. That is, people become capital-based firm-owners in the third solution, they
become ability-based firm-owners in the fourth solution, and lastly they continue to be
paid-employees in the fifth solution. If wage-earners in this ability interval can
accumulate high wealth by saving, they become firm-owners in a capital-intensive
industry in the second period of their lives. In this case, M2 is the profit of the capital61

based firm plus amount left from initial wealth and saving after investment spending for
the new firm plus interests earned from them. The fourth solution indicates that paidemployees can found ability-based firms in the second period by using their savings if
accumulated money is enough to pay the capital investment necessary for that type of
firm. M2 value of this solution is composed of the profit of the ability-based firm, amount
left from initial wealth and saving after investment spending for the new firm, and their
interest earnings. In the fifth solution, they are paid-employees in both periods of their
lives because their initial wealth and the second-period accumulated wealth are not high
enough to establish any type of firm. Therefore, M2 of the fifth solution has wage, saving,
initial wealth, and interests earned from saving and initial wealth.

The Firm's Problem:

If the agent chooses to set up a firm, he becomes a potential entrepreneur and has to
face the following problem of a profit maximizing firm.

П j=Max[ f 1j , f 2j ]

(20)

subject to
k 1i  θ

(21)

k 2i  θS

(22)

j

j

k 2  k1
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(23)

j

j

γ1  γ2

(24)

where Πij is the profit of a firm operating in industry-i in period-j.

As presented by the objective function of the firm, a potential entrepreneur has two
industry alternatives from which he will choose maximum-yielding one for his firm.
Production functions of these alternative industries are as shown in equation (5). That is,
they both have exogenously given personal ability level, A, and a capital kij of industry-i
in period-j. Exogenous interest rate, r, also plays an important role in the potential firm
owner's decision together with saving and initial wealth. Representative agent chooses the
industry that fits his liquidity and personal ability constraints as well as maximizes his
firm's profit, Π. In other words, his initial wealth has to be greater than ki1 which denotes
capital required for industry-i in the first period. Moreover, his second period wealth must
be greater than ki2 that shows capital invested for industry-i in the second period. As it
can be seen from inequality (22), his wealth at the beginning of the second period
consists of his initial wealth plus saving. As shown by the third constraint, capital
necessary for a capital-intensive industry is greater than that necessary for an abilityintensive industry in the same period. On the other hand, marginal contribution of
personal ability is greater in the ability-intensive industry than capital-intensive industry
as indicated in the last constraint. Maximized profits for the first and the second periods
are
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2

A A1 , A2 AA , A  A , A1 A A2 and k 2θ S
A1 A A2 and A2 A A*
A2 AA* , A* A
A1 A A2 , A2 AA* and θ S k 21
A2 AA* , A* A and k 22 θSk 21

}

(26)

Values of maximized profits differ according to ability group. That is, since lowability individuals (i.e., the ones whose personal ability levels are less than A1) choose to
be paid-employees in both periods of their lives, their maximized profits are zero.
Similarly, since high-ability individuals whose personal ability levels are greater than A*
choose to have ventures in an ability-intensive industry in both periods of their lives if
they have enough liquidity, their maximized profits in this case are f2. However, if they do
not have liquidity necessary for an ability-intensive industry, they become wage-earners
in the first period. Therefore, their first-period profits are zero. Paid-employees in this
ability interval become ability-based firm-owners in the second period if they can
accumulate required funds for the investment through saving. If they can do it, then their
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second-period profits are f2, otherwise their second-period profits are zero. Because, they
continue to work as paid-employees in the second period if their accumulated funds are
not high enough for investment.

Individuals having personal ability levels between A1 and A2 decide to have firms in a
capital-intensive industry if their initial wealth allow in both periods of their lives. In this
case, their maximized profits are f1. However, if they do not have enough initial wealth,
they become paid-employees in the first period, and then they establish capital-based
firms in the second period by using their savings accumulated during the first period.
Consequently, their first period profits are zero and the second period profits are f1. The
third case for these individuals is being paid-employees in both periods of their lives.
This last case occurs if they cannot accumulate funds necessary for a capital-intensive
industry. Thus, their profits in both periods are zero.

People whose personal ability levels are greater than A2 and less than A* establish
either capital-based or ability-based firms in the first period, and continue operating the
same firms in the second period of their life. Thus, if they decide to set up firms in an
ability intensive-industry, their profits are f2. But, if their choices are to found capitalbased firms, their profits become f1. In addition, they become paid-employees when
young, and establish capital-based firms when old if their accumulated wealth enable
payments for investment in the third case. Thus, their first-period profits are zero and the
second-period profits are f1 .But, if their second-period funds are high enough only for an
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ability-intensive industry, they become firm-owners in this types of the industry.
Therefore, their first-period profits are zero and the second-period profits are f2 in the
fourth case. The fifth case exists if their second-period total wealth are so low that they
cannot found their own firms. Then, their profits in both periods of their lives are zero
because their occupational choices are being paid-employees.

Testable Implications of the Model

The model implies four predictions all of which are examined against data. The first
prediction is about how wealth affects occupational decisions and firm formation
activities of individuals. Even though a capital-intensive industry requires more capital
investment than an ability-intensive industry, they both require wealth for the set up.
Prediction-1 states the first testable implication of the model as follows:

Prediction 1: Wealthy people are more likely to enter into self-employment by founding
firms in both capital-intensive and ability-intensive industries. That is, both industry
types require wealth.

The second prediction of the model is related with the timing of establishing firms.
Since individuals can save and accumulate wealth necessary for forming firms over time,
the model implies that liquidity constrained young people can become firm-owners in
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both capital-intensive and ability-intensive industries later in life. That is, they found
firms when they get older by using their savings. Prediction-2 presents this implication.

Prediction 2: Entries into both industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive,
will often happen later in life.

Prediction-3 states the third prediction of the model. This prediction describes the
industry preferences of high-ability individuals. Since individuals at the upper end of the
skill distribution have high personal ability level required for an ability-intensive
industry, they are more likely to found ability-based firms.

Prediction 3: High-ability people are more likely to enter ability-intensive industry.
Last prediction concerns occupational choices of low-ability individuals. Working as a
wage-earner is the optimal occupational choice for them due to their lower personal
ability levels.

Prediction 4: Low-ability people are more likely to do wage-work.
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Empirical Analysis

Data and Empirical Methods:

In order to explore the impact of organizational capital on the firm formation
activities of people, I am going to study testable implications of my theoretical model in
this empirical part. For this purpose, I use two-year panel data constructed from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). My data contain 13,886 individuals in years 20032007. I choose this time period for data because it has all information that I need for this
study. I use household heads in my sample because they are family members about whom
the greatest amount of information is available.

Since people are divided into four categories according to their personal ability levels
in theoretical model, I have to measure personal ability level and distinguish individuals
in my sample accordingly in this empirical part. Total labor income of individuals
depends on individual characteristics like age, gender, education, work experience, and
personal ability. We can measure age, gender, education, and work experience but we
cannot measure personal ability level directly. There are two ways of measuring ability
used in literature. The first, which is used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008)
holds the education level constant. They construct a percentile rank in the skill
distribution separately for people having the same highest degree. They measure relative
ability as the position of a given individual within the pay distribution in a given year
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among individuals with the same highest degree. Their method seems logical because we
observe large income differences among people having identical observable human
capital. However, this method ignores the impacts of work experience, age, and gender
on personal labor income. These additional characteristics can also create large
differences in labor income. The one with more work experience can earn more than
others although all have identical highest degrees.

The second way of measuring personal ability is to use residual income as a proxy.
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) use this method to determine ability levels of
individuals and therefore their relative positions in the skill distribution. This is a more
logical way of measuring ability level. It controls for the effects of age, gender, and
education level on personal labor income and uses the residual as a measure of ability. As
Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) indicate, ability has been used as the rubric for all
unmeasured earnings endowments, which may include genetic endowments of ability,
preschool human capital, or motivation.

I also use residual income in this study as a proxy to determine the position of an
individual in the skill distribution. Unexplained incomes used in this chapter are residuals
from a regression of the logarithm of income on some observable individual variables.
These variables are age, gender, education, and work experience. A general form of the
wage regression is given below.
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Ln(income)i,t = γ0 + γ1 Yi + γ2 Zi,t + εi,t

(27)

where the vector Yi represents a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, and
the vector Zi,t represents a set of time-varying individual characteristics of person-i in
year-t. Since regression of wage on education is biased [Garen (1984) and Weiss (1995)],
I used Heckman two-step correction to obtain unbiased parameters. Marital status and the
number of children at home are used in the selection equation in addition to the other
variables. Table 10 presents wage regression and the first stage estimates. The first stage
estimates show that being married and having more education are positively correlated.
More educated people tend to have fewer children. Results of the wage regression
indicate that more education raises earnings, more work experience induces higher
incomes, and males earn more than females. These are all familiar and unsurprising
results. The lambda term is significant and negatively signed. This means that the error
terms in the selection and primary equations are negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved
factors that make participation more likely tend to be associated with lower wages.

Since roles of human capital and physical capital in the firm formation decisions
are analyzed, there are both wage-earners and self-employed individuals in my sample.
Summary statistics of residual income for wage-earners and self-employed individuals
are given in Table 11.
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Table 10 : Results of Labor Income Regression
Constant

8.6142***
(0.1094)

Age

0.0139***
(0.0009)

Gender

0.4208***
(0.0172)

Education

0.0658***
(0.0032)

Work Experience

0.0072***
(0.0011)
- 1.4123***
(0.3168)

Lambda
R2

0.2819
First Stage Estimates

Age

0.0211
(0.1031)

Gender

0.4309**
(0.1465)

Married

0.1675*
(0.0146)

Number of Children

- 0.5901**
(0.0412)

Work Experience

- 0.0184
(0.1040)

R2

0.2991

Observations

13,886

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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Table 11: Summary Statistics of Unexplained Incomes
Wage-Earners

Self-Employed

Mean

0.023

- 0.089

Std. Dev.

0.725

1.273

25th
Percentile

- 0.913

- 1.351

60th
Percentile

- 0.006

- 0.009

90th
Percentile

0.453

0.489

100th
Percentile

1.045

1.334

Observations

12,407

1,479

Table 11 and Figure 8 show that mean residual income for self-employed people is
smaller than that for wage-earners. However, the variance of unexplained income for
self-employed people is larger. Unexplained income of self-employed individuals is
lower than that of wage-earners at the first 60th percentile and higher above the 90th
percentile.

Since occupational decisions of people having distinct positions in the skill
distribution are not the same, they are divided into four ability groups in the model.
Consistent with the model, I also use four ability groups to classify individuals in my
sample according to their positions in the skill distribution. People at the first 25th
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percentile of the skill distribution are in G1. Since they are at the lowest end, they are
called low-ability people in this chapter. Individuals at the highest end of the skill
distribution are classified as high-ability people. They constitute the top 10 % of the skill
distribution. People in between these two ends are also divided into two additional groups
as G2 and G3. Group G2 contains the next thirty five percent of the skill distribution after

0

.2

Density
.4

.6

.8

G1. People in G3 constitute the thirty percent of the skill distribution below those in G4.

-10

-5
Unexplained Income

0

5

self-employed
wage-earner

Figure-8: Unexplained Income Distributions for Paid-Employees and Self-Employed

Incomes of wage-earners and self-employed people are not the same. Summary
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statistics of annual total labor income for wage-earners and self-employed individuals are
given in Table 12. Table 12 and Figure 9 show that mean incomes of self-employed
people are greater than those of wage-earners. The same is also true for the variances.
That is, variances of incomes for self-employed individuals are larger than those for
wage-earners. Incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners
at the first 25th percentile and higher at the 60th percentile. That is, lower-ability
individuals are, on average, earning more by being wage-earners than becoming selfemployed. Higher-ability individuals, on the other hand, are earning more by becoming
self-employed than staying as wage-earners.

Table 12: Mean Annual Total Labor Income for Two Employment Groups
(Paid-Workers and Self-Employed Individuals).
Wage-Earners

Self-Employed

Mean

41,248

52,614

Std. Dev.

44,581

148,564

25th Percentile (G1)

16,423

15,283

60th Percentile (G2)

36,109

39,024

90th Percentile (G3)

51,735

60,683

100th Percentile (G4)

64,289

76,639

Observations

12,407

1,479
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Figure-9: Earning Distributions for Wage-Earners and Self-Employed People

Consistent with theoretical model, I divided industry data into two categories which
are capital-intensive industry and ability-intensive industry14 according to the amount of
capital needed to enter. That is, major costs of a capital-intensive industry includes costs
coming from investments in equipment, machinery, or other expensive capital goods
Kleindorfer and Wu (2003). Mining, utilities, railroads, construction, and heavy
manufacturing are capital-intensive industries. Financial services and software
development, however, are typically non capital-intensive Schmidt (2004). Capitalintensity is also defined as the asset-intensity Datta and Rajagopalan (1998). In other
words, founding a new firm in a capital-intensive industry requires a high investment in
14 Appendix-IV shows the lists of Capital-Intensive and Ability-Intensive Industries in PSID
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fixed assets Ghemawat (1991); Harrigan (1981). Thus, amount of fixed assets required
for production creates the distinction between a capital-intensive industry and an abilityintensive industry. A new firm needs more funds for its fixed asset investments if its
industry is capital-intensive, whereas it needs less money for its fixed asset investments if
its industry is ability-intensive. Because the PSID does not include data for fixed asset
investment costs or capital asset requirements of the industries, industry classification in
this paper is done according to the definitions and classifications provided by the related
literature as stated previously. Since abilities or skills of the individuals who found and
operate the firms are within the human capital, estimated ability level of the individual is
used as a proxy to reflect his human capital in this study. Entrepreneurial earnings of
individuals differ along with the industry which is chosen for the new firm.

Summary statistics of entrepreneurial incomes according to industry preferences are
given in Table 13. It shows that mean earning of entrepreneurs in an ability-intensive
industry is greater than that of entrepreneurs in a capital-intensive industry. That is,
founding a firm in an ability-based industry brings, on average, higher income than
founding a firm in a capital-intensive industry. For the variances, it is observed that
variances of incomes for self-employed individuals in an ability-intensive industry are
greater than those for self-employed individuals in a capital-intensive industry.
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Table 13: Mean Entrepreneurial Incomes of People in Ability-Intensive
and Capital-Intensive Industries.
Ability-Intensive
Industry

Capital-Intensive
Industry

Mean

64,319

52,025

Std. Dev.

175,007

163,426

G1

16,139

17,214

G2

44,201

37,319

G3

68,151

61,178

G4

95,740

73,950

586

893

Observations

Entrepreneurial income from an ability-intensive industry is lower than that from a
capital-intensive industry for firm-owners at the 25 th percentile. Therefore, founding a
firm in a capital-intensive industry brings more profit than founding the firm in an abilityintensive industry for these low-ability individuals in G1. In contrast, firm-owners at the
top 10th percentile earn more by having the firm in an ability-intensive industry than
having it in a capital-intensive industry. In other words, high-ability entrepreneurs in G4
are getting higher profits from having ability-based firms than having capital-based firms.
For firm-owners in G2 and G3, mean earnings in a capital-intensive industry are less than
those in an ability-intensive industry.
I used multinomial logit 15 to analyze my panel data. Three main forms of my
15

Multinomial Logit, used by Schmidt and Strauss (1975), is utilized in my empirical analysis in order
to observe relative probabilities.

77

regressions are given in equations (24), (25), and (26) which are run for each ability
group separately. In the specifications, P1 shows probability of choosing to stay in paidwork, P2 shows probability of choosing to enter high-ability self-employment, and finally
P3 shows probability of choosing to enter high-capital self-employment for individual-i. I
used age, wealth, and personal ability level as independent variables in all regressions to
test the predictions of my theoretical model. Dependent variable in equation (28) shows
relative probabilities of choosing to enter high-ability self-employment and to stay in
paid-work.

Loge (P2 / P1)i = α0 + α1 (Age)i + α2 (Wealth)i + α3 (Ability)i + εi

(28)

Similarly, dependent variable in regression (29) shows relative probabilities of choosing
to enter high-capital self-employment and to stay in paid-work.

Loge (P3 / P1)i = μ0 + μ1 (Age)i + μ2 (Wealth)i + μ3 (Ability)i + ε i

(29)

Dependent variable of the last specification given below shows relative probabilities of
choosing to enter high-capital self-employment and high-ability self-employment.

Loge (P3 / P2)i = δ0 + δ1 (Age)i + δ2 (Wealth)i + δ3 (Ability)i + εi
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(30)

Empirical Results :

Table-14 exhibits results obtained from the empirical analysis. Results from Part A
indicate that greater ability makes it more likely to enter high-ability self-employment
than does wage work for G3 and G4 individuals. This result is as expected because the
model implies that founding ability-based firms brings more monetary return than doing
wage work for the ones in G3 and G4. Moreover, Part B shows that more ability makes it
more likely to enter high-capital self-employment than to do wage work for people in G2,
G3, and G4. These results are statistically significant only for those in G3 and G4. Since
establishing capital-based firms is more profitable than working as wage-earners for
them, this implication is also consistent with the model. It can be seen from Part C that
more ability makes it more likely to enter high-ability self-employment than to enter
high-capital self-employment for those in G3 and G4 even though these results are not
significant. Thus, we can conclude that more ability makes it the most likely outcome to
enter high-ability self-employment for high-ability people in G4. The conclusion is
consistent with Prediction-3 which states that high-ability people are more likely to enter
ability-intensive industry.

On the other hand, Part A implies that more ability makes it less likely to enter highability self-employment than to do wage work for individuals in G1 and G2. In addition,
Part B shows that more ability makes it less likely to enter high-capital self-employment
than to do wage work for people in G1. That is, outcomes for low-ability people indicate
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that working as wage-earners becomes more likely outcome than founding own firms
when personal ability level increases. Thus, this is not consistent with the model. Results
presented in Part C show that more ability makes it less likely to enter high-capital selfemployment than to enter high-ability self-employment for individuals in G1. And more
ability makes it more likely to enter high-capital self-employment than to enter highability self-employment for individuals in G2. But, these results are not significant. Since
the last prediction of the model shown by Prediction-4 indicates that low-ability people
are more likely to do wage-work, these empirical results for individuals in G1 are
inconsistent with it. If we look at the empirical results related with wealth in Part A, we
observe that more wealth makes it more likely to enter high-ability self-employment than
to do wage work for all individuals in four ability groups.

Similarly, Part B shows that more wealth makes it more likely to enter high-capital
self-employment than to do wage work for all people but especially for the ones in G2,
G3, and G4. These results are as expected according to the model because both capitalintensive and ability-intensive industries require wealth for firm formation although
amount of wealth necessary for an ability-based firm is less than that necessary for a
capital-based firm. Outcomes in Part C imply that more wealth makes it less likely to
enter high-capital self-employment than to enter high-ability self-employment for
individuals in G1, G2, and G3. Greater wealth makes it more likely to enter high-capital
self-employment than to enter high-ability self-employment for people in G4.
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Table 14: Relative Probabilities of Three Occupational Choices
G1

G2

G3

G4

A. Dependent Variable: Loge (P2 / P1)
Constant
Age

- 4.6162***
(0.2454)

- 5.0979***
(0.3685)

0.0286***
(0.0049)

0.0307***
(0.0081)

Wealth

2.97e-07**
(1.21e-07)

Ability

- 0.5141***
(0.0709)

8.08e-07***
(1.51e-07)
- 0.7935
(0.6314)

- 5.1964***
(0.5410)
0.0102
(0.0098)

- 5.4541***
(0.6403)
0.0212*
(0.0118)

7.63e-07***
(1.38e-07)

4.56e-07***
(1.40e-07)

1.7852**
(0.7131)

1.5622***
(0.2873)

B. Dependent Variable: Loge (P3 / P1)
Constant

- 3.9957***
(0.2489)

- 3.5851***
(0.3610)

- 3.3427***
(0.4896)

- 2.2499***
(0.5878)

Age

0.0098*
(0.0053)

- 0.0084
(0.0090)

- 0.0259***
(0.0097)

- 0.0435***
(0.0124)

3.98e-07*
(2.32e-07)

4.74e-07***
(1.43e-07)

Wealth

1.46e-08
(2.46e-07)

Ability

- 0.5894***
(0.0719)

5.32e-07**
(2.36e-07)
0.1633
(0.6893)

1.3221*
(0.6835)

1.0488***
(0.3543)

C. Dependent Variable: Loge (P3 / P2)
Constant

0.6196*
(0.3289)

1.5279***
(0.5067)

1.8426**
(0.7200)

3.1939***
(0.7852)

Age

- 0.0186***
(0.0067)

- 0.0389***
(0.0118)

- 0.0360***
(0.0136)

- 0.0654***
(0.0164)

Wealth

- 2.84e-07
(2.52e-07)

- 2.77e-07
(2.31e-07)

- 3.65e-07
(2.37e-07)

1.79e-08
(5.39e-08)

Ability

- 0.0753
(0.0822)

0.9578
(0.9307)

- 0.4633
(0.9739)

- 0.5084
(0.3620)

Pseudo R2

0.06

0.03

0.0298

0.08

Observations

3,809

4,903

3,759

1,414

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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However, results in Part C are statistically insignificant. Consequently, it can be said that
these empirical results about wealth are consistent with Prediction-1 which says that
wealthy people are more likely to enter into self-employment by founding firms in both
capital-intensive and ability-intensive industries. That is, both industry types require
wealth.

In order to test Prediction-2, I use age as an independent variable in the regressions.
Associated results in Part A show that it is more likely to enter high-ability selfemployment than to do wage work for all individuals in four ability groups when they get
older. The results are statistically significant for the ones in G1, G2, and G4. Moreover,
Part B indicates that it is more likely to enter high-capital self-employment than to do
wage work for individuals in G1 when they get older. These empirical results support
Prediction-2 that entries into both industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive,
will often happen later in life. Because, liquidity constrained young individuals can found
firms in both industry types when they get older by using their savings. The model
implies that saving money to accumulate wealth necessary for the new firms takes time.
However, empirical results shown in Part B also point out that it is less likely to enter
high-capital self-employment than to do wage work for individuals in G2, G3, and G4
when they get older. Since these results are statistically significant only for the ones in G3
and G4, it can be said that empirical results for G3 and G4 people contradict with
Prediction-2.
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Conclusion

This chapter explores the role of organizational capital, human capital and physical
capital, in the firm formation activities of people at different skill levels by constructing
a theoretical model and analyzing its testable implications empirically. Existing industries
are categorized as a capital-intensive industry or an ability-intensive industry so that they
can be distinguished according to main organizational capital required. A capitalintensive industry requires more physical capital consequently more funds for investment
whereas, an ability-intensive industry requires more human capital. Human capital refers
to personal ability level in this chapter. Individuals are also divided into four groups
according their personal ability levels in order to observe occupational differences among
them.

It is shown that occupational choices and firm formation actions of people in distinct
ability groups differ. That is, more ability makes the most able individuals at the top 10 %
of the skill distribution more likely to set up firms in an ability-intensive industry
because, they earn the greatest income from it. The required high-ability level for an
ability-intensive industry does not constitute a barrier for them, instead it stimulates these
individuals' ability-based firm formation activities. On the other hand, the model implies
that low-ability people at the lowest 25 % of the skill distribution earn the least income if
they establish ability-based firms because of their limited personal ability levels. In other
words, their low personal ability levels constitute an entry barrier to an ability-intensive
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industry. Since being wage-earners brings the greatest monetary return for these lowability individuals, they become paid-employees. However, this implication for lowability individuals is not supported empirically. Results indicate that they are more likely
to work as wage-earners than to found their own firms when personal ability level
increases.

The model indicates that firm formation actions of other individuals in between lowability and high-ability people also depend on their initial wealth, savings, and personal
ability levels. The ones in G2 choose to found firms in a capital-intensive industry
because it brings the greatest monetary return for them. However, this can be achieved if
they have enough initial wealth for the investment. Thus, wealthier G2 people become
capital-based firm-owners when young and continue operating the same firms when old.
Liquidity constrained G2 people, on the other hand, become wage-earners when young
and establish their own capital-based firms when old by using their accumulated savings.
If their savings are not high enough, they continue to work as paid-employees in the
second period. This means that required high funds for a capital-intensive industry
constitute an entry barrier for them. And having an ability-based firm does not bring the
greatest return for them due to the lack of necessary high human capital. The last group of
people in G3 also have the greatest earning from establishing a capital-based firm. But,
some of them choose to set up ability-based firms which bring the second greatest
earning due to not having high amount of wealth. Since place of these people in G3 is
between 60 % and 90 % of the skill distribution, they have relatively higher personal
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ability levels. Thus, required high human capital is not a big barrier for them. Remaining
G3 individuals become paid-employees in the first period, then they establish their own
firms in the second period of their life. Their second-period firms can be capital-based or
ability-based depending on the amount of savings. In other words, G3 people with high
accumulated wealth set up their own capital-based firms whereas, others with less
accumulated wealth found their ability-based firms. If their accumulated wealth is lower
than the amount of funds necessary for an ability-based firm, they continue to be wageearners in the second period.

Additional two predictions of the model are also tested against data to observe the
implications of theoretical cases. Prediction-1 is supported by the empirical results. That
is, since both industry types require wealth even though the amount of funds necessary
for them are different, wealthy people are more likely to found both capital-based and
ability-based firms. On the other hand, Prediction-2 is partly supported by empirical
results. Namely, it is empirically proofed that entries into an ability-intensive industry
often happen later in life. This results is true especially for the ones in G1 and G2.
Moreover, entries into a capital-intensive industry also happen later in life for individuals
in G1. However, entries into a capital-intensive industry do not happen later in life for
people in G3 and G4. And this last result for G3 and G4 people contradicts with
Prediction-2.

85

IV. CHAPTER 3 : WHO EARNS MORE? FUTURE ENTREPRENEURS OR
THEIR NON-ENTREPRENEURIAL COLLEAGUES

Introduction

This chapter investigates earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their
non-entrepreneurial colleagues by considering the chosen industries of the new firms.

Earning differentials in self-employment and paid-employment were investigated by
Hamilton (2000). He found that the median hourly wages of future entrepreneurs are
higher than the wages of employees remaining on the job, and as a result he concluded
that there must be significant nonpecuniary benefits to owning a business. However, this
result may change if industry preferences of future entrepreneurs are taken into
consideration. Thus, I explore the determinants of self-employment by studying incomes
of employees remaining on the job, future entrepreneurs whose preference is a capitalintensive industry, and future entrepreneurs whose preference is an ability-intensive
industry. A capital-intensive industry refers to an industry requiring substantial
investment in capital assets, and consequently requiring more liquidity for the production
of goods. An ability-intensive industry is an industry requiring more human capital
instead of monetary capital for the production of goods. I hypothesize that individuals
that form new firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more than others
remaining in wage-work. Since an ability-intensive industry requires a relatively high
skill level, they are more likely to have higher abilities. On the other hand, people who
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found new firms in a capital-intensive industry were earning less than employees
remaining on the job.

Observations on a sample of individuals in the PSID are used in this chapter. A panel
is constructed for the period 2003-2007. This time period is selected for the sample
because it includes all information needed for the analysis. Since entrepreneurial
behaviors of people having distinct ability levels are not the same [Elfenbeim, Hamilton,
and Zenger, (2008)], individuals are divided into four groups according to their personal
skills.

In order to measure personal skill level, I construct an indicator for innate ability
from the residuals obtained in a regression of labor earnings on age, gender, education,
and work experience (cf. Behrman and Rosenzweig, 1999). Education is not taken as a
part of ability because two people having the same education level can earn different
incomes even though they both do identical jobs, because of their distinct personal
abilities. Individuals are placed in four ability groups, denoted by G1 through G4, with
G1 representing the lowest ability group. These are not quantiles. Group G1 accounts for
the first 25 percent of the observations, G2 accounts for the next thirty five percent, G3
accounts for the next thirty percent, and G4 represents the top ten percent.

The empirical results agree with prior research. That is, high-ability individuals that
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form new firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more than others remaining
in paid-work. Since a high-ability industry requires more skills but less capital, this result
for G3 and G4 people supports my hypothesis. Moreover, estimates indicate that lowability people that found firms in a capital-intensive industry were earning less than
others remaining in wage-work. This is also consistent with my expectation because
industry preferences of G1 and G2 individuals for new firms are capital-intensive. Since a
high-capital industry requires more capital but less skill, this result for low-ability people
also supports my hypothesis.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and empirical
methods, section 3 provides the empirical results, and the last section concludes.

Data and Empirical Methods

In order to analyze earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their nonentrepreneurial colleagues, I use two-year panel data constructed from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). My data contain 13,860 individuals in years 2003-2007. I
choose this time period for data because it has all information that I need for this study. I
use household heads in my sample because they are family members about whom the
greatest amount of information is available.

Since personal ability level is the key element that creates earning differentials
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among people having similar human capital, I have to measure personal ability level and
distinguish individuals in my sample accordingly. Total labor income of people depends
on individual characteristics like age, gender, education, work experience, and personal
ability. We can measure age, gender, education, and work experience but we cannot
measure personal ability level directly. There are two ways of measuring ability used in
literature. The first, which is used by Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) holds the
education level constant. They construct a percentile rank in the skill distribution
separately for people having the same highest degree. They measure relative ability as the
position of a given individual within the pay distribution in a given year among
individuals with the same highest degree. This method seems logical because we observe
large income differences among people having identical observable human capital.
However, this method ignores the impacts of work experience, age, and gender on
personal labor income. These additional characteristics can also create large differences
in labor income. For instance, the one with more work experience and/or older can earn
more than others although all have identical highest degrees. Thus, the effects of personal
characteristics like age, gender, and work experience should also be controlled so that
innate personal ability which creates the difference can be measured.

The second way of measuring personal ability is to use residual income as a proxy
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). This is a more logical way of measuring skill level. It
controls for the effects of age, gender, and education on personal labor income and uses
the residual as a measure of ability. As Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) indicate, ability
89

has been used as the rubric for all unmeasured earnings endowments, which may include
genetic endowments of ability, preschool human capital, or motivation.

I also use residual income in this study as a proxy to determine the position of an
individual in the skill distribution. Unexplained incomes used in this chapter are residuals
from a regression of the logarithm of income on some observable individual variables.
These variables are age, gender, work experience, and education. A general form of the
wage regression is given below.

Ln(income)i,t = γ0 + γ1 Yi + γ2 Zi,t + εi,t

(31)

where the vector Yi represents a set of time-invariant individual characteristics, and the
vector Zi,t represents a set of time-varying individual characteristics of person-i in year-t.
As indicated by Garen (1984) and Weiss (1995), regression of wage on education is
biased. Thus, I used Heckman two-step correction to obtain unbiased parameters in my
labor income regression. Marital status and number of children at home are used in the
selection equation in addition to other variables. OLS estimates of wage regression and
the first-stage results are presented in Table 15. The first stage estimates show that being
married and having more education are positively correlated. And more educated people
have fewer children. This result is consistent with the indications of Kenny, Lee,
Maddala, and Trost (1979). That is, married people specialize in the labor market more
than singles, and accordingly have a greater intensive to invest in human capital.
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Table 15: Labor Income Regression Estimates
Constant

8.7121***
(0.1106)

Age

0.0150***
(0.0011)

Gender

0.4325***
(0.0176)

Education

0.3703***
(0.0052)

Work Experience

0.0094***
(0.0014)

Lambda

- 1.4369***
(0.3289)

R2

0.3893
First Stage Estimates

Age

0.0211
(0.1031)

Gender

0.4309**
(0.1465)

Married

0.1676*
(0.0162)
- 0.5901**
(0.0405)

Number of Children

- 0.0183
(0.1042)

Work Experience
R2

0.2984

Observations

14,860

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 % level;
**Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level

Familiar results of the wage regression indicate that having more education raises
earnings, more work experience induces higher incomes, and males earn more than
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females. The lambda term is significant and negatively signed. This means that the error
terms in the selection and primary equations are negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved
factors that make participation more likely tend to be associated with lower wages.

Since earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their nonentrepreneurial colleagues are analyzed, there are both wage-earners and self-employed
people in my sample. Summary statistics of residual income for wage-earners and selfemployed individuals are given in Table 16. Table 16 and Figure 10 show that mean
residual income for self-employed people is smaller than that for wage-earners. However,
the variance of unexplained income for self-employed people is larger. Unexplained
incomes of self-employed individuals are lower than those of wage-earners at the 25 th
percentile and higher above the 90th percentile.

Table 16: Unexplained Income Statistics
Wage-Earners

Self-Employed

Mean

0.011

- 0.089

Std. Dev.

0.713

1.272

25th Percentile

- 0.914

- 1.350

60th Percentile

- 0.007

- 0.009

90th Percentile

0.455

0.469

100th Percentile

1.041

1.315

Observations

12,392

1,468
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As Elfenbeim, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008) show entrepreneurial behaviors of
individuals having distinct places in the skill distribution are different. That is, low-ability
and high-ability individuals are more likely to be self-employed. Moreover, two industry
types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, utilized in this chapter differs according to
the main input required for the production. Namely, personal skill level is the main input
for an ability-intensive industry, whereas a large amount of capital investment is the main
input for a capital-intensive industry. Thus, individual skill level is expected to be an
important criteria in the industry selection of a potential entrepreneur in this study. Since
my aim is to analyze previous earnings and subsequent self-employment choices of
people having different skill levels by considering their industry choices for the new
firms, individuals are divided into four groups according to their personal abilities.
People at the first 25th percentile of the skill distribution are in G1. Since they are at the
lowest end, they are called low-ability people in this chapter. Individuals at the highest
end of the skill distribution are classified as high-ability people. They constitute the top
10 % of the skill distribution. People in between these two ends are also divided into two
additional groups as G2 and G3. Group G2 contains the next thirty five percent of the
skill distribution after G1. People in G3 constitute the thirty percent of the skill
distribution below those in G4. Incomes of wage-earners and self-employed people are
not the same. Summary statistics of annual total labor income for wage-earners and selfemployed individuals are given in Table 17.
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Figure-10: Unexplained Income Distributions (Wage-Earners and
Self-employed Individuals)

Table 17: Mean Annual Total Labor Income for Wage-Earners and
Self-Employed People
Wage-Earners

Self-Employed

Mean

41,252

52,539

Std. Dev.

43,581

148,266

25th Percentile (G1)

16,316

15,176

60th Percentile (G2)

36,009

39,025

90th Percentile (G3)

51,741

60,670

100th Percentile (G4)

64,279

76,538

Observations

12,392

1,468

94

Density
5.000e-06.00001 .000015 .00002
0
0

50000

100000
150000
Annual Total Labor Income

200000

self-employed
wage-earner

Figure-11: Income Distributions for Paid-Workers and Entrepreneurs

Table 17 and Figure 11 show that mean and variance of income for self-employed
people are greater than those for wage-earners. Incomes of self-employed people are
lower than those of wage-earners at the first 25th percentile and higher at the 60th
percentile. That is, lower-ability individuals, on average, are earning more by being
wage-earners than becoming self-employed. Higher-ability people, on the other hand, are
earning more by becoming self-employed than staying as wage-earners.

Since two industry types, capital-intensive and ability-intensive, are utilized as the
industry choices of future entrepreneurs, industry classification done in previous chapter
is also used in this chapter.

Similar to the second chapter, estimated ability level of an
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individual is used as a proxy to reflect his human capital in this chapter. Earnings of firmowners differ according to the industry chosen for the new firms. Summary statistics of
entrepreneurial incomes according to the industry types are given in Table 18.

Table 18: Summary of Entrepreneurial Incomes in Ability-Intensive and
Capital-Intensive Industries
Ability-Intensive
Industry

Capital-Intensive
Industry

Mean

64,319

52,011

Std. Dev.

175,007

163,430

G1

16,139

17,209

G2

44,201

37,099

G3

68,151

61,138

G4

95,740

73,941

585

883

Observations

Table 18 shows that mean earnings of entrepreneurs in an ability-intensive industry
is greater than that of entrepreneurs in a capital-intensive industry. This means that
founding a firm in an ability-based industry brings, on average, higher income than
founding a firm in a capital-intensive industry. For the variances, it is observed that
variance of incomes for self-employed individuals in an ability-intensive industry is
greater than that for self-employed people in a capital-intensive industry.
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Entrepreneurial income from an ability-intensive industry is lower than that from a
capital-intensive industry for firm-owners at the 25 th percentile. Therefore, founding a
firm in a capital-intensive industry yields, on average, more earnings than founding the
firm in an ability-intensive industry for these low-ability people in G1. In contrast, firmowners at the 10th percentile earn more by having the firm in an ability-intensive industry
than having it in a capital-intensive industry. In other words, high-ability entrepreneurs in
G4 are getting higher profits from having an ability-based firm than having a capitalbased firm. For firm-owners in G2 and G3, mean earning in a capital-intensive industry is
less than that in an ability-intensive industry.

Tables 19 and 20 show employment patterns in my data. Table 19 shows that 10.6 %
of paid-employees became self-employed while, 89.4 % of them stayed as paidemployees.

Table 19: Employment Patterns: Number and Fraction of Workers by Mobility Group

Paid-Employee in year t
(Number & Fraction)

Self-Employed in
year t+2

Paid-Employee in
year t+2

Total

1,468
0.106

12,392
0.894

13,860
1.00

Table 20 shows that 18.1 % of self-employed people whose choices are abilityintensive industries are in G1 whereas, 24.8 % of them are in G4. Ability groups G2 and
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G3 contain 23.1 % and 34 % of ability-based firm-owners, respectively. Similarly, 28.5 %
of people who are self-employed in a capital-intensive industry are in G1 while, 10.3 %
of them are in G4. Moreover, 36.6 % and 24.6 % of capital-based firm-owners are in G2
and G3, respectively.

Table 20: Employment Patterns: Number and Fraction of Workers by Industry Types
Self-employed in year t+2
G1

G2

G3

Total
G4

A. Ability-Intensive Industry
Paid-Employee in year t
(Number & Fraction)

106
0.181

135
0.231

199
0.340

145
0.248

585
1.00

B. Capital-Intensive Industry
Paid-Employee in year t
(Number & Fraction)

252
0.285

323
0.366

217
0.246

91
0.103

883
1.00

I use year-pairs in my regressions because my aim is to explore earning differences
between people who become self-employed and their colleagues who stay as wageearners two years later. The regression used for this purpose is given in equation (32).
Since there are two industries that can be chosen for the new firms, this regression is run
separately for each industry type.

LIi,t = μ0 +μ1 Yi + μ2Zi,t + μ3SEi,t+2 + εi,t
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(32)

where LIi,t is employee labor income and SEi,t+2 is a dummy variable that equals one if
individual-i enters self-employment in year t+2. The terms Yi and Zi,t are two vectors used
in all equations to test the impacts of individual characteristics. The vector Yi represents a
set of time-invariant individual characteristics and the vector Z i,t represents a set of timevariant individual characteristics of person-i in year-t. Specifications (32) is run for each
ability group separately.

Empirical Results

Tables 22 and 23 present resulting estimates of the regressions used to investigate
earning differences between people who become self-employed and their colleagues who
stay as wage-earners two years later. Since entry into self-employment two years later is
endogenous, family size is used as an IV variable. In order to justify the usage of family
size as an IV variable, firstly, its correlation with the disturbances in regression (32) is
tested. This testing is done by re-estimating regression (32) with family size being added
as an explanatory variable for each industry type. Estimated coefficients16 on family size,
presented in Table 21, are not significantly different from zero. That is, family size is not
an omitted variable. This result supports the validity of family size as an IV variable.
Secondly, relevance of family size as an IV variable is investigated by the first stage
regressions presented in Part-B sections of Tables 22 and 23 for each industry type.

16 Estimates for the other explanatory variables are as expected. That is, more work experience increases
income. Individuals earn more when they get older. And males earn more than females. [ Borjas and
Bronars (1989), Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990)]
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Table 21: Validity of IV Variable (Testing for Omitted Variables)
G1

G2

G3

G4

A. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant

8.5697***
(0.0750)

9.5305***
(0.0279)

9.8641***
(0.0314)

9.5850***
(0.0812)

Family Size

0.0107
(0.0237)

- 0.0184
(0.0349)

- 0.0219
(0.0452)

0.0184
(0.0231)

Age

0.0089***
(0.0016)

0.0172***
(0.0008)

0.0207***
(0.0007)

0.0293***
(0.0018)

Gender

0.6983***
(0.0339)

0.4965***
(0.0123)

0.4237***
(0.0130)

0.5937***
(0.0335)

Work Experience

0.0086***
(0.0021)

0.0148***
(0.0009)

0.0175***
(0.0008)

0.0179***
(0.0021)

Self-Employment
Dummy for an AbilityIntensive Industry

0.2102
(0.3706)

0.1762
(0.2363)

0.2893***
(0.0419)

0.5726***
(0.0721)

R2

0.3205

0.2070

0.2404

0.2612

Observations

3,079

4,613

4,082

1,205

B. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant

8.6071***
(0.0731)

9.5313***
(0.0278)

9.8719***
(0.0313)

9.5836***
(0.0815)

Family Size

0.0130
(0.0236)

- 0.0185
(0.0649)

- 0.0213
(0.0751)

0.0194
(0.0431)

Age

0.0085***
(0.0016)

0.0172***
(0.0006)

0.0206***
(0.0007)

0.0298***
(0.0018)

Gender

0.6857***
(0.0332)

0.4991***
(0.0130)

0.4312***
(0.0129)

0.6048***
(0.0341)

Work Experience

0.0079***
(0.0024)

0.0148***
(0.0008)

0.0172***
(0.0019)

0.0179***
(0.0020)

- 0.8618***
(0.0746)

- 0.3604***
(0.0394)

- 0.2857
(0.3411)

- 0.1941
(0.3802)

Self-Employment
Dummy for a CapitalIntensive Industry
R2

0.2906

0.3710

0.2729

0.2802

Observations

3,225

4,801

4,100

1,151

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. ***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level
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Corresponding results on family size are positive and statistically significant.
Namely, individuals having larger families are more likely to be self-employed in both
ability-intensive and capital-intensive industries. Thus, family size is a valid and relevant
IV variable.

Estimates about personal characteristics shown in Tables 22 and 23 imply that people
earn more when they get older. Males earn more than females. And more work
experience increases income. Results in part-A of Table 22 indicate that individuals that
form new firms in an ability-intensive industry were earning more than others remaining
on the job. The implication is valid for people in four ability groups, but estimates are
statistically significant only for those in G3 and G4. Since individuals in G3 and G4
constitute the top 40 % of the skill distribution, they are high-ability people. These results
indicate that high-ability people who become self-employed were earning more than their
non-entrepreneurial colleagues. Their industry preferences for new firms are high-ability
industries. Since a high-ability industry requires more skills but less capital, this result for
high-ability people is reasonable.

Estimates in Part-A of Table 23 imply that people that form new firms in a capitalintensive industry were earning less than others remaining in wage-work. This is true for
all individuals in four ability groups. However, the results are statistically significant
only for those in G1 and G2. Since individuals in G1 and G2 are at the lowest tail of the
skill distribution, they are low-ability people. These estimates indicate that low-ability
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Table 22: Estimated Mobility Coefficients for Transitions from Paid-Work to
Self-Employment in an Ability-Intensive Industry
G1

G2

G3

G4

A. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant

6.1654
(15.0057)

10.2690***
(0.0431)

10.3470***
(0.5496)

11.5464***
(0.7728)

Age

0.0174***
(0.0096)

0.0105**
(0.0029)

0.0169***
(0.0022)

0.0182***
(0.0075)

Gender

0.5726***
(0.0239)

0.3698**
(0.1105)

0.4790***
(0.0392)

0.3793***
(0.1065)

Work Experience

0.0056*
(0.0018)

0.0095***
(0.0042)

0.0117***
(0.0023)

0.0198**
(0.0059)

Self-Employment
Dummy for an AbilityIntensive Industry

4.1214
(6.8965)

5.6652
(1.8624)

3.8412**
(1.8544)

1.7769***
(0.1579)

R2

0.2933

0.1025

0.3011

0.2621

Observations

3,079

4,613

4,082

1,205

B. The First Stage IV Regressions
Family Size

0.2061***
(0.0306)

0.1974***
(0.0268)

0.4168***
(0.0375)

0.5648***
(0.1195)

Age

0.0201***
(0.0052)

0.0269**
(0.0113)

- 0.0029
(0.0142)

0.0022
(0.0139)

Gender

0.3027**
(0.1425)

0.3509**
(0.1741)

0.8135***
(0.2437)

0.5109**
(0.2275)

Work Experience

- 0.0027
(0.0120)

0.0123
(0.0195)

0.1248**
(0.0107)

0.0213
(0.0179)

Pseudo R2

0.1405

0.0974

0.1429

0.0797

Observations

3,079

4,613

4,082

1,205

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level

people who become self-employed were earning less than their non-entrepreneurial
colleagues. Their industry preferences for new firms are high-capital industries.
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Table 23: Estimated Mobility Coefficients for Transitions from Paid-Work to
Self-Employment in a Capital-Intensive Industry
G1

G2

G3

G4

A. Dependent Variable: Employee Labor Income (Wage)
Constant

9.4957***
(0.1461)

11.3628***
(2.6203)

10.8686***
(0.0353)

11.6154***
(0.8180)

Age

0.0076**
(0.0028)

0.0242***
(0.0010)

0.0189***
(0.0032)

0.0264***
(0.0058)

0.7325**
(0.1838)

0.4690***
(0.0165)

0.4701**
(0.1092)

0.3695**
*
(0.0368)

Work Experience

0.0146**
(0.0025)

0.0074**
(0.0046)

0.0173***
(0.0029)

0.0103**
(0.0064)

Self-Employment
Dummy for a CapitalIntensive Industry

- 3.4079***
(0.5453)

- 4.6318***
(1.7986)

- 5.2235
(1.5612)

- 1.0111
(1.5097)

Gender

R2

0.2933

0.1026

0.3012

0.2611

Observations

3,225

4,801

4,100

1,151

B. The First Stage IV Regressions
Family Size

0.6731**
(0.0502)

0.7195***
(0.0369)

0.2786**
(0.0134)

0.8439***
(0.1306)

Age

0.0156**
(0.0081)

0.0321***
(0.0098)

- 0.0007
(0.0123)

- 0.0012
(0.0154)

Gender

0.2104
(0.2271)

0.1654
(0.2509)

5.0766
(7.1203)

0.1705
(0.3120)

Work Experience

0.0003
(0.0089)

0.0089
(0.0110)

0.0215
(0.0179)

0.2111**
(0.0169)

Pseudo R2

0.0672

0.0187

0.0492

0.1209

Observations

3,225

4,801

4,100

1,151

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
***Significant at 1 % level; **Significant at 5 % level; *Significant at 10 % level

Since a high-capital industry requires more capital but less skill, this result for low-ability
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people is also reasonable.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzes earning differentials between future entrepreneurs and their
non-entrepreneurial colleagues. Future entrepreneurs are categorized according to their
industry choices, capital-intensive or ability-intensive, for the new firms. A capitalintensive industry requires more physical capital investment, while an ability-intensive
industry requires more personal skill. Implications of the empirical results support my
hypotheses. Namely, high-ability individuals that establish new firms in an abilityintensive industry were earning more than others remaining in wage-work. And lowability G1 and G2 people that found new firms in a high-capital industry were earning
less than others remaining in paid-work.
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APPENDICES
I. Writing M2 in terms of M1 and C1 for different ability groups :

For A1 < A < A2 and k11 > θ :

We know that

2

2

M 2= Π 11r θ−k 1 S  and

We can rewrite M2 as

2

S=M 1−C 1

2

M 2= Π 11r θ−k 1 1r S

Plug S into M2,
M 2= Π 211r θ−k 21 1r  M 1−C 1
M 2=
Π 121r θ−k 21 1r  M 1−C 1 
Y2

Thus, M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1

For A* < A , A2 < A < A* and k21 ≤ θ < k11 :
We know that

2

1

M 2= Π 21r θ−k 2 S  and

We can rewrite M2 as

2

1

M 2= Π 21r θ−k 2 1r S

Plug S into M2,
2

S=M 1−C 1

1

M 2= Π 21r θ−k 2 1r  M 1−C 1

M 2=
Π 221r θ−k 12 1r  M 1−C 1 
Y2

Thus, M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1
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For A < A1 :
M 2=W 1r θS  and

We know that

We can rewrite M2 as

S=M 1−C 1

M 2=W 1r θ 1r  S

Plug S into M2,
M 2=W 1r θ 1r  M 1−C 1 

M 2=W
1rθ 1r M 1 −C 1 

Y2

Thus, M 2=M 11r M 1−C 1 

For A1 < A < A2 and A2 < A < A* and k11 ≤ θ :

We know that

2

1

M 2= Π 11r θ−k 1S  and

We can rewrite M2 as

M 2= Π 211r θ−k 11 1r  S

Plug S into M2,
2

1

M 2= Π 11r θ−k 1 1r  M 1−C 1 

Then,
2

1

M 2= 
Π 1 1r θ−k 11r M 1−C 1 
Y2

Thus,

S=M 1 −C 1

M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1
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For A* < A and A2 < A < A* and k21 > θ :
2

2

M 2= Π 21r θ−k 2 S  and

We know that

We can rewrite M2 as

2

S=M 1−C 1

2

M 2= Π 21r θ−k 2 1r S

Plug S into M2,
2

2

M 2= Π 21r θ−k 2 1r  M 1−C 1

Then,

M 2= 
Π 221r θ−k 22 1r  M 1−C 1 
Y2

M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1

Thus,

As a result,

M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1 for all ability groups.

where

{

W 1r  θ
2
1
Π 1 1r θ−k 1
Y 2= Π 22 1r θ−k 12
2
2
Π 1 1r θ−k 1
2
2
Π 2 1r θ−k 2

if
if
if
if
if

AA1
A1 A A2
*
A2 A A
A1 AA2
*
A2 A A

II. Solving Household's Problem :

We know from Appendix-I that M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1
112

*

1

, A2 A A and k 1θ
*
1
1
and A  A and k 2θ k 1
1
and k 1θ
*
1
, A A and k 2θ

}

M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1=C 2

Since M2 = C2 , we have
Therefore,

L=lnC 1  β lnC 2λ [Y 2 1r M 1−C 1 −C 2 ]
First order conditions are,
∂L
1
= − λ1r =0
∂C 1 C 1

∂L
β
= −λ=0
∂C 2 C 2

Thus,

1
= λ1r  
C1

λ=

then,

1
β
=
1r C 1 C 2

C 2 =β 1r  C 1



1
C 1 1r  and

λ=

β
C2

We know that C2 = M2

 M 2= β 1r C 1
C 1 =

M2
β 1r 

We know from Appendix-I that

C 1 =

M 2=Y 21r M 1−C 1

Y 21r  M 1 −C 1
β 1r 
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 β 1r C 1 =Y 2 1r  M 1−C 1 
 β 1r C 1 1r C 1 =Y 21r  M 1
 1 β 1r  C 1=Y 21r  M 1

Therefore, consumption in the first period is



C 1=

  

1
1
Y 2
M1
1 β 1r 
1β

S=M 1−C 1

Saving is



 S =M 1−

  

1
1
Y 2−
M1
1 β 1r 
1 β

S=

Thus, saving is

We know that

  



β
1
M 1
Y
1 β
1 β1r  2

C 2= β 1r C 1

Therefore, consumption in the second period is

C 2=



  

β 1r 
β
M 1
Y
1 β
1 β 2

As a result, the first period consumption, saving, and the second period consumption are
as the followings:

  

C 1=



1
1
M 1
Y
1 β
1 β1r  2
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S=

  

C 2=



β
1
M 1
Y
1 β
1 β1r  2



  

β 1r 
β
M 1
Y
1 β
1 β 2

where

{

if
if
if
if
if

W 1r θS 
П 211r θ −k 11S 
M 2= П 221r θ −k 12S 

{

if
if
if

A A1 , A2 A A , A A , A1 A A2 and k 2 θS
A1 A A2 and A2A A*
A2 A A* , A* A

П 211r θ −k 21S 
2
2
П 21r θ −k 2S 

if
if

A1A A2 , A2AA* and θS k 21
*
*
2
2
A2 A A , A  A and k 2θ S k 1

{

W 1r  θ
Π 21 1r θ−k 11
Y 2= Π 22 1r θ−k 12
Π 21 1r θ−k 21
Π 22 1r θ−k 22

A A1
A1A A2
A2 A A*
A1 A A2
A2AA*

}

W θ
П 11 θ−k 11
M 1= П 12θ−k 12
W θ
W θ

, A2A A* and k 11θ
and A* A and k 12 θk 11
and k 11θ
, A* A and k 12 θ

*

if
if
if
if
if

AA1
A1 A A2
A2 A A*
A1 AA2
A2 A A*
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*

2

, A2 A A* and k 11θ
and A* A and k 12θ k 11
and k 11θ
, A*A and k 12θ

}

}

П 11 = f 11 =k 11 Aγ 11
П 12= f 12=k 12 Aγ 12
П 12= f 21=k 21 Aγ 12
П 22= f 22=k 22A γ 22

III. Lists of Capital-Intensive and Ability-Intensive Industries in PSID :
Capital-Intensive Industries are
– Mining
– Utilities
– Construction
– Manufacturing
– Wholesale Trade
– Transportation and Warehousing
– Accommodations and Food Services

Ability-Intensive Industries are
– Information
– Finance and Insurance
– Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
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– Management, Administrative and Support, and Waste Management Services
– Educational Services
– Health Care and Social Assistance
– Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
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